The Virginia Defamation Law Blog
In a recent decision underscoring the limits of defamation law in political contexts, a federal district court dismissed defamation claims brought by the American Conservative Union and its foundation against former employees who allegedly linked the organizations to George Soros, Mark Zuckerberg, and John Arnold. The court’s ruling in American Conservative Union v. Institute for Legislative Analysis clarifies that merely associating an organization with controversial figures—even those despised by the organization’s core constituency—does not constitute actionable defamation under Virginia law.
The plaintiffs, the American Conservative Union (ACU) and the American Conservative Union Foundation (ACUF), host the annual Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) and publish ratings of state and federal lawmakers based on voting records. In February 2024, the defendant Institute for Legislative Analysis published a series of articles titled the “Soros Files,” authored by a former ACU employee. The articles included statements such as:
- “Soros, Zuckerberg and Arnold have so heavily invested in CPAC to control its scorecard”
- “Meet CPAC Billionaire Funder George Soros”
- “CPAC has at least two Soros-funded prosecutors on its staff”
ACU and ACUF alleged these statements were defamatory, arguing they falsely accused the organizations of allowing donations to influence their scorecard results. Following publication, a major donor withdrew sponsorship of CPAC 2024, citing the Soros Files as the reason. The plaintiffs brought defamation per se claims against the defendants.
The court dismissed the defamation claims, holding that the allegedly defamatory statements lacked the requisite “sting” to be actionable under Virginia law and that they failed to qualify as defamation per se because the statements did not necessarily prejudice the plaintiffs in their profession or trade.
Insufficient Defamatory Sting
To be actionable as defamation, a statement must “injure one’s reputation in the common estimation of mankind, to throw contumely, shame or disgrace upon him, or which tends to hold him up to scorn, ridicule, or contempt.” The court found that the challenged statements—which merely alleged associations between the plaintiffs and certain wealthy donors—failed this test.
The court rejected the notion that controversial associations automatically satisfy the defamatory sting requirement. Drawing on Supreme Court of Virginia precedent in Fleming v. Moore, the court noted with approval decisions from other jurisdictions holding that accusations of political associations do not constitute defamation. As one court observed, “while a statement that a person is a Republican may very possibly arouse adverse feelings against him in the mind of many Democrats, and even diminish him in their esteem, it cannot 
be found in itself to be defamatory.” (See Guilford Trans. Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 594 (D.C. Ct. App. 2000)).
The court acknowledged that six of the seven challenged statements merely alleged associations between the plaintiffs and Soros, Zuckerberg, or Arnold, without explaining how such associations were “necessarily hurtful” to the plaintiffs’ business. The plaintiffs offered no allegations that association with these figures would injure their reputation “in the common estimation of mankind”—only that such associations might upset their conservative donor base.
Defamation Per Se in the Business Context
The plaintiffs attempted to establish defamation per se under the fourth recognized category: statements that “prejudice such person in his or her profession or trade.” However, the court clarified that this category requires more than demonstrating adverse business impact. Rather, the defamation must be “necessarily hurtful” to the plaintiff’s business and must “touch upon the plaintiff in his special trade or occupation.”
The court found the plaintiffs had not articulated how the challenged statements met this standard. That a statement may cause a sponsor to withdraw support does not automatically render it defamatory per se. The statement must relate to the plaintiff’s fitness or integrity in conducting its specific business, not merely create political controversy.
The court did identify one statement that came closest to alleging defamation per se: the claim that “Soros, Zuckerberg and Arnold have so heavily invested in CPAC to control its scorecard.” Even this statement, however, did not directly accuse the plaintiffs of allowing donors to control results. Instead, it “ascribe[d] a motive as to why those individuals would want to contribute to CPAC” without stating that such control actually occurred.
This decision offers important guidance for political organizations, advocacy groups, and public figures navigating defamation claims in polarized environments. The ruling establishes that organizations cannot bootstrap political controversy into defamation liability. Statements linking an organization to controversial donors or political figures—even those reviled by the organization’s supporters—do not automatically meet the threshold for defamation.