Articles Posted in First Amendment

If truth is a complete defense to a defamation action, what about “scientific truth”? Are scientific findings “facts” that can form the basis of a defamation action if a particular scientist contends they are inaccurate? If so, how much of a consensus is required before a matter of scientific inquiry can be considered “settled” and thus a matter of established fact? Anti-vaxxers have filed a number of defamation actions around the country against media outlets accusing them of spreading misinformation. Few (if any) have been successful. The consensus among the courts appears to be that defamation actions are not an appropriate means of addressing arguments over unsettled questions over which vaccines treat disease most effectively. It’s not so much a matter of whether matters of scientific inquiry should be regarded as facts or opinions but of the practical reality that academic questions on complex scientific topics just aren’t the sort of thing courts or juries are equipped to resolve as definitively true or false. Courts are interested in protecting First Amendment rights, not in picking sides in a scientific debate.

Case in point: Dr. Peter A. McCullough v. Gannett Company, filed earlier this year in the Eastern District of Virginia. Dr. Peter McCullough is a cardiologist and epidemiologist who has been a vocal critic of the medical response to the COVID-19 crisis. According to his complaint, he is “considered one of the world’s leading experts on COVID-19.” The Bartlesville Examiner-Enterprise, an Oklahoma newspaper owned by Gannett Company, ran a story in October 2021 about an upcoming appearance Dr. McCullough was to make at a local community center. The article contains several quotes from a Dr. Anuj Malik, an infectious disease physician who strongly disagreed with Dr. McCullough’s views on the effectiveness of the COVID vaccine. Dr. McCullough claimed the following statements attributed to Dr. Malik were defamatory: Continue reading

In Virginia, injunctions are considered an extraordinary remedy and, due to First Amendment concerns, are generally not available to enjoin a person from speaking. Known as “prior restraints,” injunctions against defamatory speech are disfavored and bear a heavy presumption against validity. The Supreme Court has written that “a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them…beforehand.” (See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975)). There are exceptions, however, such as (a) when a defendant’s defamatory speech was uttered in connection with the commission of a separate tort, (b) when a defendant engages in repeated defamation, or (c) when the speech has already been adjudicated to be defamatory.

Although neither the Virginia Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has had the opportunity to consider whether a prevailing defamation plaintiff may obtain an injunction prohibiting the defendant from repeating the speech adjudicated to be defamatory, most courts around the country approve of the practice, reasoning that any other rule “would make an impecunious defamer undeterrable.” (McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2015)). Earlier this year, the Eastern District of Virginia followed the trend and granted an injunction to restrain the defendant from repeating certain statements held to be defamatory.

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Another federal judge faced with interpreting Virginia’s insulting-words statute has found that (1) a face-to-face confrontation is not required, and (2) if the words at issue are defamatory per se, then they automatically satisfy the requirements of the statute. The case is Christen Waddle v. Aundrea Claughton, currently pending in the Danville Division of the Western District of Virginia.

The facts of the case (as alleged in the complaint and recited in an earlier opinion) are essentially as follows. Ms. Waddle was driving down the street minding her own business, when she encountered an emaciated dog (not the one pictured) running loose in the middle of the road. The dog appeared to be in bad shape. It had scratches on its face and its ribs were visible. Feeling sorry for the dog, she decided to scoop it up and take it to Animal Control. She called the number on the dog’s collar but no one answered. She then found the owner’s Facebook page and contacted him through Facebook, letting him know she was taking the dog to Animal Control.

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Under the current statute, suits in Virginia for libel, slander, or “insulting words” can only be brought within one year from the time of publication. Earlier this month, delegate Dave Albo filed House Bill No. 1635, proposing that the Commonwealth increase the limitations period to two years, and providing further that in cases involving Internet defamation by anonymous tortfeasors, the statute of limitations be suspended (or “tolled”) upon a motion and showing of good cause. If the bill passes, it will make it a lot easier to identify and bring to justice those persons who use the Internet to conceal their identities while unleashing a barrage of false and harmful statements about another individual or business.

Statutes of limitation have been debated for hundreds of years. In a law review article written over 100 years ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. asked, “what is the justification for depriving a man of his rights, a pure evil as far as it goes, in consequence of the lapse of time?” In other words, why have statutes of limitation at all? Shouldn’t every wrong have a remedy? There are some who feel that claims should be resolved on their merits regardless of when they are brought, whereas others argue that untimely claims should be forever extinguished. Most states have reached a consensus that defamation claims should be limited to one or two years, primarily due to concerns about First Amendment principles and a desire to avoid the chilling of free speech.
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So you may have heard that environmental scientist Paul Brodeur is seeking $1 million in damages for libel, defamation, slander and false light against the movie studios behind 2013’s highly acclaimed film American Hustle. Why? Because according to him, the movie damaged his reputation by “attributing…a scientifically unsupportable statement” to him. Had this action been filed in Virginia rather than California, it would not likely go very far.

Here’s the scene: it’s the late 1970s or early 1980s, and the two characters played by Christian Bale and Jennifer Lawrence are arguing about the new microwave oven that just exploded in their kitchen:

Irving Rosenfeld: I told you not to put metal in the science oven! What did you do that for?

Virginia practitioners will know more about this topic in a few months, when the Supreme Court of Virginia decides Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, but for now, we have an opinion from Fairfax Circuit Court applying the six-part test established by Yelp for uncovering the identity of anonymous Internet speakers.

The case is Geloo v. Doe, decided June 23, 2014. Fairfax attorney Andaleeb Geloo filed a defamation action against various anonymous posters to the Fairfax Underground site and sought to uncover their identities by issuing subpoenas to Time Warner Cable, Verizon, and Cox Communications. At issue were statements referring to Ms. Geloo as a “run of the mill court appointed attorney” and a “fat Paki,” and a statement accusing Ms. Geloo herself as being the secret author of a discussion thread entitled “Andi Geloo – Bullshit Artist.”
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Courts grant temporary injunctions sparingly and only after the moving party has alleged and proved facts entitling it to relief. Injunctive relief generally is not available to prohibit the making of defamatory statements as prior restraints on speech violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Injunctions may sometimes be granted, however, where the defamatory words are made in the furtherance of the commission of another intentional tort. Care must be taken to ensure that any injunction is narrowly tailored to achieve the pin-pointed objective of the needs of the case, as prior restraints on speech are considered the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.

In Chevaldina v. R.K./FL Management, Inc., a Florida appellate court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting an injunction against defamatory speech. Irina Chevaldina was an unhappy former tenant of R.K. Management which owned and managed commercial properties in South Florida. When R.K. discovered that Ms. Chevaldina was the author of anonymous, unflattering blog posts about it, it added several tort claims to its already pending action for defamation per se and libel against the previously anonymous blogger. The tort claims included counts for tortious interference with contractual and advantageous business relationships.
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The First Amendment protects anonymous speech, including online reviews of products and services written by people using fake names. The right to anonymous speech, however, is not absolute. Defamatory speech, whether or not anonymous, is not entitled to protection, as there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. If someone pretending to be a former customer writes a defamatory review on Yelp, Amazon, or some other consumer-review site, but doesn’t disclose his or her real name, how does the business owner go about identifying the individual so that the individual can be held accountable? The answer lies in Section 8.01-407.1 of the Code of Virginia, which sets forth a specific procedure for uncovering the identities of people who communicate anonymously over the Internet.

The proper application of this statute was recently discussed in Yelp v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, a case arising out of Alexandria. As of October 2012, Yelp’s site contained seventy-five reviews about Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, many of them critical. Included among these reviews were assertions by anonymous authors claiming to have been charged for work never performed and claiming that “precious rugs were shrunk.” Hadeed sued the anonymous authors for defamation, alleging that the reviewers were never actual customers of Hadeed.

After filing the lawsuit, Hadeed promptly issued a subpoena duces tecum to Yelp, demanding the production of documents that would enable Hadeed to identify the authors of the allegedly defamatory reviews. Yelp objected, arguing that Hadeed had not complied with the requirements of Section 8.01-407.1. Hadeed revised its subpoena to comply with the statute, but Yelp continued to object and refused to comply. On a motion to compel compliance, the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria held that Hadeed’s subpoena satisfied the requirements of both the statute and the First Amendment, and ordered Yelp to disclose the information. Yelp refused, and was held in contempt. It then appealed that ruling to the Virginia Court of Appeals (which has jurisdiction to consider appeals of civil contempt orders), arguing that the First Amendment requires a showing of merit on both the law and facts Rugs.jpgbefore a subpoena duces tecum to identify an anonymous speaker can be enforced. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding in a case of first impression that Section 8.01-407.1 is not unconstitutional and that it alone provides the unmasking standard in Virginia.

To be actionable as libel, a statement must reasonably imply false and defamatory facts when read in context. Context is important because the setting of the speech makes its nature apparent and helps determine how its intended audience would have interpreted the statement. In some cases, a literally false statement will not be actionable because contextual factors demonstrate that the true meaning of the statement is something other than what the words alone might suggest. In other words, the statement that a plaintiff must prove false to prevail in a defamation case is not necessarily the literal phrase published but rather what a reasonable reader would have understood the author to have said. In Farah v. Esquire Magazine, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit discussed the importance of these principles in a case involving political satire.

Jerome Corsi is the popular author of several New York Times bestsellers and the book “Where’s the Birth Certificate? The Case that Barack Obama is Not Eligible to be President” published by WND Books. Joseph Farah is the Editor and CEO of WND’s parent company, WorldNetDaily.com, a competitor of Esquire Magazine. On the day after “Where’s the Birth Certificate” was released, Esquire published an online article on “The Politics Blog” entitled “BREAKING: Jerome Corsi’s Birther Book Pulled from Shelves!” A copy of the Drudge Siren, a symbol of sensationalistic news, appeared above an image of the book’s cover. The article claimed that Farah had announced plans to recall and “pulp” the entire first run of the book and to refund purchaser’s money because three weeks earlier, Obama had produced his long form birth certificate indicating he was born in Hawaii. Later, Esquire published an update clarifying that the article was satirical, but the writer of the article referred to Corsi as an “execrable piece of shit” in an interview published on another online publication, The Daily Caller.

Farah and Corsi sued for defamation and other torts. According to the complaint, after the article was published, Farah received numerous requests for confirmation of the story and comment, and consumers began requesting refunds. The plaintiffs also claimed that they were attacked by book supporters and that book stores pulled the book from their shelves or refused to sell it. Farah and Corsi contended that Esquire only published the update after Farah indicated that he was exploring legal options and that the update was likewise false and defamatory. The district court granted Esquire’s motions to dismiss under both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and D.C.’s Anti-SLAPP Act, D.C. Code § 16-5501 et seq.

The First Amendment dictates that religious organizations are entitled to decide matters of church governance, faith and doctrine without state interference. Accordingly, as a general rule, courts may not hear disputes involving religious law, principle, doctrine, discipline, custom or administration. In what has come to be known as the “ecclesiastical abstention” doctrine, courts should normally abstain from adjudicating issues involving theological or spiritual judgment, or the internal governance of religious bodies. Courts will often classify the issue as one involving jurisdiction, noting that the religious bodies have exclusive jurisdiction over their own internal workings.

For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia once considered a church pastor’s defamation claim against a church deacon based on his statement that the pastor had “borrowed over $100,000 from believers and has not returned the money.” While an express or implied accusation of theft would normally be treated as defamation per se under Virginia law, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment “divests a civil court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider a pastor’s defamation claims against a church and its officials.”

Still, courts may exercise jurisdiction over defamation actions involving religious organizations where “neutral principles of law” may be applied to resolve the dispute. The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently granted certiorari to consider the question of whether a pastor may use the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause to shield himself from defamation liability stemming from statements he made about the church’s trustees at a congregational meeting or whether the court could apply neutral principles of law to decide the case. The court found that “a tortfeasor is not shielded from liability simply by committing his torts within the walls of a church or under the guise of church governance.”

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