Articles Posted in Privileges

The jury trial in the libel and slander case of Dominion Voting Systems v. Fox News Network is now less than two weeks away. The consensus among defamation law experts seems to be that the “big issue” in this case is whether Fox acted with “actual malice,” a requirement established by the seminal First Amendment case of New York Times v. Sullivan back in 1964. Public figures can’t win defamation suits unless they can prove the defendant made a false statement about them with actual malice, generally defined as knowledge of falsity or, at a minimum, “reckless disregard” for the truth, which is the equivalent of a high degree of awareness that the statement at issue is probably false. In most cases, that’s a very difficult thing to prove, and many defamation cases fail due to an inability of the plaintiff to prove actual malice. Dominion’s case against Fox, however, is anything but ordinary. From my perspective, the only real chance Fox had of winning this case at the trial level was not to convince the jury that it failed to act with actual malice (an unlikely prospect) but rather to convince the jury that it was merely broadcasting newsworthy allegations made by others and that it was not necessarily endorsing those allegations. In a recent pretrial ruling, however, the court found that a reasonable jury could only conclude that Fox did, in fact, endorse the conspiracy theories and adopt the accusations against Dominion as its own. The jury won’t be allowed to even consider the issue. That means this case is essentially done. Dominion wins. The only question is how high the judgment amount will be.

Prior to the court’s recent ruling on Dominion’s motion for summary judgment, Fox had a glimmer of hope. After all, Dominion is the party with the burden of proof, not Fox. It is Dominion that needs to prove that the statements made about Dominion on Fox’s broadcasts were false and that Fox is responsible for making them, even if the statements were made only by guests on Fox programming. Even with all the media coverage about those behind-the-scenes text messages by Fox hosts in which they reveal their true feelings about the outlandish and unsupported accusations against Dominion being made by the likes of Sidney Powell and Mike Lindell, at least they could argue to the jury that when a member of the President’s legal team makes a public accusation that a manufacturer of voting machines was complicit in a giant scheme to flip votes and steal an election, that is a newsworthy event that Fox should cover, regardless of whether the accusation is true or false; the accusation itself is news. Sadly for Fox, that ship has sailed. The court has already entered partial summary judgment establishing not only that the statements about Dominion made by Fox guests were false, but that Fox is responsible for republishing those statements as if they were Fox’s own accusations against Dominion.

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It’s never a good idea to slander another person, but in some circumstances a privilege may apply to a defamatory statement that exempts the statement from any libel or slander claims. Statements made on the witness stand in a legal proceeding, for example, are immune from defamation claims (even if they are false). The justice system is designed to sort out which witnesses are lying and which are telling the truth; it doesn’t permit an aggrieved individual to sue witnesses who offered unfavorable testimony during the trial. In other contexts, a “qualified” privilege may apply to the communication. In these situations, the privilege is not absolute and will be forfeited if abused. A qualified privilege generally attaches to communications between persons on a subject in which the persons share an interest or duty. For example, consider the employee performance review, where the person completing the review form and the person receiving it both share an interest or duty in the review being conducted. In situations like these, the reviewer is generally permitted–and expected–to include whatever negative feedback may be appropriate without having to worry about getting sued by the employee for defamation. However, this privilege is not absolute; a qualified privilege does not give the reviewer a license to maliciously defame another individual with impunity.

Defamatory words uttered with malice will not be protected by qualified privilege. This means that a plaintiff may often be able to pursue a defamation claim even when the claim is based on a statement made in a privileged context. A plaintiff can overcome the qualified privilege with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant made the statement with “malice” (not to be confused with “actual malice.”) Malice in this context can be shown in a variety of ways, such as a showing that (1) the statements were made with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard for their truth; (2) the statements were communicated to third parties who have no duty or interest in the subject matter; (3) the statements were motivated by personal spite or ill will; (4) the statements included strong or violent language disproportionate to the occasion; or (5) the statements were not made in good faith. (See Cashion v. Smith, 286 Va. 327, 339 (2013)).

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Under Virginia law, an absolute privilege protects speakers and writers from defamation claims when their statements are made in certain contexts. Absolute privilege will apply if the statement claimed to be defamatory was made in connection with (1) judicial proceedings (including preliminary proceedings sufficiently related to judicial proceedings); (2) proceedings before the Virginia Employment Commission; (3) proceedings of bodies creating legislation; or (4) military or navel communications among officers, provided the statement was relevant and pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the absolute privilege does apply, the statement is completely immune, even if knowingly false and made maliciously. The maker of an absolutely privileged communication is accorded complete protection against defamation claims. (See Lindeman v. Lesnick, 268 Va. 532, 537 (2004)). This is far stronger protection than offered by qualified privilege, which provides only limited protection that can be defeated upon a showing of malice or other bad faith. Absolute privilege is an affirmative defense that can be raised in an answer or plea in bar. As with other affirmative defenses, absolute privilege should not be presented to the court by demurrer, as demurrers test only the facial validity of the allegations in a complaint. (See Givago Growth, LLC v. iTech AG, LLC (Va. 2021)).

By far the most common situation in which absolute privilege is invoked involves statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding. If someone lies about you in court, you can’t turn around and sue the person for slander. The adversarial judicial system is designed to allow fact finders to consider the evidence and determine the truth, and it’s a given that not every statement made by testifying witnesses in court will be truthful. There are also potential penalties for perjury for untrue statements made in court. For these and other reasons, Virginia courts have long held that statements made in connection with judicial proceedings are protected by an absolute “judicial privilege” against defamation liability when they are relevant and pertinent to the matter under inquiry. (See Darnell v. Davis, 190 Va. 701, 707 (1950)). The absolute judicial privilege protects not only witness statements made orally in court, but all statements in connection with the proceeding, including pleadings and statements made during depositions and discovery.

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In Virginia, the right of the media to report freely and fairly on the operations of the government is sacrosanct. Reporters and news organizations that report on government activities are shielded from defamation claims by a “fair report privilege” that applies so long as the publication is a “fair and substantially correct statement of the transcript of the record.” (See Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West, 198 Va. 154 (1956)). The privilege protects “press reports of official actions or proceedings, so long as the report was accurate and either complete or fairly abridged.” (See Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.3d 1087, 1097 (4th Cir. 1993)). Everyone has a right of access to public records, and the fair report privilege makes it easier for the media to communicate the information contained therein to the public so that the government can be held accountable.

Some courts view the fair report privilege or “reporter’s privilege” as an exception to the republication rule. Normally, a person who repeats a defamatory statement is liable for republishing it, just as if he or she were the original speaker. Where a reporter repeats a defamatory statement made at a proceeding covered by the fair report privilege, however, no republication liability will attach provided the report is a fair characterization of what was originally said. If a media account of a government proceeding is fair and accurate, the publisher will be protected even if statements made at the proceeding and repeated in the publication were false and defamatory.

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As often repeated on this blog, the expression of an opinion is protected by the First Amendment and cannot form the basis of a defamation claim. “It is firmly established that pure expressions of opinion are protected by both the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Virginia and, therefore, cannot form the basis of a defamation action.” (See Williams v. Garraghty, 249 Va. 224, 233 (1995)). What’s an opinion? Generally speaking, it’s a relative statement told from the speaker’s personal perspective that isn’t susceptible of being proven true or false. It’s a statement that can’t reasonably be interpreted as conveying actual facts about a person. If a jury instruction is worded in such a way as to allow for the possibility that the jury will find a defendant liable for defamation based on a statement of opinion, that verdict will likely be set aside or reversed. People are entitled to their opinions, no matter how negative or disparaging they might be; you can’t go around suing everyone who criticizes you (not successfully, anyway) unless that criticism includes defamatory falsehoods in addition to the negative opinions being expressed.

It isn’t always easy to distinguish statements of fact from statements of opinion, and lawyers get this wrong all the time. The latest decision of the Virginia Supreme Court to deal with this issue is the case of Amanda C. Padula-Wilson v. Scott David Landry, decided May 14, 2020. The plaintiff was a mother of three children involved in custody and visitation proceedings. When the custody hearing didn’t go as she had hoped, she sued one of the therapists for defamation. (She brought numerous other claims as well in a complaint containing 276 numbered paragraphs, but those claims are outside the scope of this blog). The trial court dismissed the claim, finding that the therapist’s statement was protected by both qualified privilege and absolute judicial privilege. The Virginia Supreme Court granted an appeal, but ultimately agreed with the trial court that the claim was not actionable and affirmed the dismissal.

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Thinking about suing the prosecuting attorney for defamation because the false criminal charges he brought against you damaged your reputation and were ultimately dismissed? Well, don’t. Just like you can’t sue a judge who finds you guilty, you generally can’t sue a prosecutor for maligning your reputation in the course of a criminal prosecution performed in good faith, even if the charges are ultimately dropped or dismissed. Both judges and–though to a lesser extent–prosecutors are immune for their official acts associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Statements made by prosecutors outside the scope of their judicial functions, however, are fair game for defamation suits.

Yesterday, the Virginia Supreme Court clarified the law in this area by holding that although a Commonwealth’s Attorney enjoys quasi-judicial immunity for acts taken within the scope of their duties and intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, this immunity does not extend to statements made by a Commonwealth’s Attorney outside the confines of a judicial proceeding. The court held that a Commonwealth Attorney’s former administrative assistant could pursue a defamation claim against her former boss based on her allegation that he made false public statements about the reasons for her termination. These statements were not made in the course of performing any judicial or quasi-judicial function, so they were not entitled to immunity.

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In Virginia, employers can fire their employees for any reason or no reason at all, subject to certain limited exceptions. Employers aren’t required to articulate a reason for letting go an employee (see Johnston v. William E. Wood & Assocs., 292 Va. 222, 225 (2016)), but they often do anyway. As you might expect, the employees getting fired don’t always agree with the reasons being offered for the termination. A common response of disgruntled employees is to sue their former employer not only for wrongful termination but for defamation as well, theorizing that their reputation was harmed as the result of false accusations made about them. This approach rarely succeeds.

In a ruling from earlier this month, a federal court threw out an employee’s defamation claim based primarily on two concepts: lack of publication, and qualified privilege. Publication refers to the requirement that an actionable statement be transmitted to some third person so as to be heard and understood by such person. Qualified privilege refers to the special protection afforded to defamatory statements made in certain contexts (like the context of a performance review or exit interview).

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In Virginia, some statements enjoy absolute immunity from defamation claims. Such statements are said to be protected by an absolute privilege. The most common of the absolute privileges is the so-called “judicial privilege,” which protects statements made in connection with and relevant to a judicial proceeding. The doctrine is typically applied to statements made by witnesses testifying in court, or to scandalous statements made in pleadings or motions filed with a court in connection with a judicial proceeding. For example, if Mrs. Smith files for divorce against Mr. Smith on the ground that he allegedly had an affair with the couple’s au pair, Mr. Smith won’t be able to sue Mrs. Smith for defamation even if the allegation about him and the au pair is completely false; the allegation was made in a judicial proceeding, so it’s absolutely privileged.

There seems to be a trend towards broadening this privilege by expanding the scope of what it means for a statement to have been made “in connection with” a judicial proceeding. In 2012, The Virginia Supreme Court held in Mansfield v. Bernabei that communications made outside of court but preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding will be absolutely privileged from defamation liability where (1) the statement is made preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding; (2) the statement is “material, relevant or pertinent” to the proceeding; (3) the proceeding is contemplated in good faith and is under serious consideration; and (4) the communication is disclosed only to persons having an interest in the proposed proceeding. The following year, a federal court sitting in Virginia held that once litigation is filed, the absolute judicial privilege could extend to statements made outside of court, even if made to persons without an interest in the litigation. And now this year, we have another federal case further extending the privilege to cover statements made in the course of a human-resources investigation of an employee’s complaint.

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Republication of a libel may be grounds for defamation liability. (See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578; Lee v. Dong–A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 878 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Under the republication rule, one who repeats a defamatory statement is as liable as the original defamer”)). Liability, however, is not automatic, and republished statements may be subject to certain privileges the same way original statements are. If a person hears a defamatory statement and proceeds to share that statement with another person, whether liability will be imposed under the republication rule will depend largely on the extent to which the person repeating the statement (i.e., spreading the rumor or gossip) adopts the statement as her own by expressing the assertion as a fact, rather than merely as a representation made by another person. If Dave says, “according to Steve, Paul is a convicted felon” and that statement is literally true (because Steve did say that) even though Paul is not actually a convicted felon, a qualified privilege may protect Dave from defamation liability even though he is guilty of republication.

The privilege is easier to establish when the statement being repeated is one made by the government or otherwise on a matter of public concern. Some states recognize a “neutral reportage” privilege, which protects the “accurate and disinterested reporting” of charges on matters of public concern made by a “responsible, prominent” party against a public figure. (See, e.g., Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2nd Cir.)). Virginia hasn’t formally adopted the “neutral reportage” privilege, but it does adhere to a so-called “fair report” privilege, which accomplishes essentially the same thing in most situations.

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As I looked over a recent batch of opinions from the Western District of Virginia, one of them caught my eye for two reasons. First, I never imagined that a person might file a federal lawsuit against Golden Corral over an accusation of stealing chicken legs. We truly live in litigious times. Second, the case reminded me of the seldom-invoked “shopkeeper’s privilege” against defamation claims, otherwise known as merchant immunity. I don’t believe I’ve written about it before, so let’s dive in.

Here’s what happened in Leah Wynette Williams v. Lisa Annette Lipscomb, according to the opinion. It was Leah Williams’ daughter’s birthday, so to celebrate, they headed out to Golden Corral along with a sibling and Leah’s mother, Phyllis. They ordered the dinner buffet, for which they paid a fixed price. As they were eating, their server, Lisa Lipscomb, seemed to hover in the general vicinity of their table, sweeping the floor continuously. At one point, the server accused the family of attempting to smuggle food home for future consumption. She warned the family that the restaurant had security cameras, and went to get the manager, telling him that she had seen Phyllis putting chicken legs in her purse. The manager asked to look inside the purse. The family refused. Instead, Leah called 9-1-1, claiming to be “in fear for her family’s lives and safety.” They waited for an officer to arrive, had a brief discussion, and that was essentially the end of the matter. That is, until Leah sued the server, the manager, and the Golden Corral franchisee for defamation and various other claims.

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