The Virginia Defamation Law Blog

May 8, 2026

Calling Someone a “Sexual Predator” Is Not Necessarily Defamatory

In a decision that should give comfort to political commentators everywhere, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed a $1,000,000 defamation verdict against a citizen who called a local school board chairman a “SEXUAL PREDATOR/HARASSER” on Facebook. The case is Petrak v. Sawyers, Record No. 0110-24-4 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2025), and it offers a textbook illustration of the principle that even the most inflammatory language can be protected opinion when the speaker fully discloses the facts on which the opinion is based. The plaintiff, Ryan Sawyers, pointed out the lack of sexual harassment complaints against him or criminal convictions and argued that the “sexual predator” label was therefore false and defamatory. Although the trial court agreed with him, the Court of Appeals did not, and clarified that statements that fully disclose their factual predicate and do not imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts are not actionable if that factual predicate is true.

The basic facts of the case are these. Ryan Sawyers was the Chairman of the Prince William County School Board. While serving in that role, he commented on a local librarian’s Facebook photo, referring to her as a “LILF.” The defendant, Bill Petrak, interpreted the remark as vulgar sexual innuendo and was disgusted by it, particularly considering Sawyers was a married man, serving on the school board, and running for Congress. (Sawyers denied the comment was sexual, claiming with a straight face that the acronym stood for “Librarian I’d Like to Fund”). Petrak, who had been leading a recall effort against Sawyers, responded with his own Facebook post in a group called “PWC Education Reform.” In that post, Petrak shared screenshots of Sawyers’s LILF comment, a tweet in which Sawyers had thanked then-Senator Al Franken, and a photograph of Franken groping (or pretending to grope) a sleeping woman on a military plane. Petrak added the following commentary:

Look closely and see the comment by Ryan Sawyers. It says “such a LILF”. I am told this person is a librarian. So basically Ryan Sawyers, a married man, is publicly saying on social media that he would like to have sex with this woman. If that isn’t the behavior of a SEXUAL PREDATOR or HARASSER I don’t know what is.

March 16, 2026

How Defamation’s Publication Requirement Limits the Relation-Back Doctrine

by Lee E. Berlik

The relation-back doctrine is a procedural mechanism that allows an amended pleading filed after the expiration of a statute of limitations to “relate back” to the filing date of the original complaint. The doctrine treats the amended pleading as if it had been filed on the date of the original complaint, thereby rescuing otherwise time-barred claims from dismissal. Its basic purpose is to permit parties to refine or clarify allegations as facts become better known, without forfeiting otherwise timely claims. After all, statutes of limitations exist to give defendants fair notice of potential liability, and if the original complaint already placed the defendant on notice of the general factual territory in dispute, allowing a later amendment within that same territory does not undermine the limitation period’s purpose. The defendant was already on notice; the amendment merely refines or expands a dispute they knew was coming.

The doctrine is codified in Virginia at Code § 8.01-6.1, which states that “an amendment of a pleading changing or adding a claim or defense against a party relates back to the date of the original pleadings for purposes of the statute of limitations if the court finds (i) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading, (ii) the amending party was reasonably diligent in asserting the amended claim or defense, and (iii) parties opposing the amendment will not be substantially prejudiced in litigating on the merits as a result of the timing of the amendment.” In federal court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).

February 8, 2026

Association with Controversial Figures Held Not Defamatory

by Lee E. Berlik

In a recent decision underscoring the limits of defamation law in political contexts, a federal district court dismissed defamation claims brought by the American Conservative Union and its foundation against former employees who allegedly linked the organizations to George Soros, Mark Zuckerberg, and John Arnold. The court’s ruling in American Conservative Union v. Institute for Legislative Analysis clarifies that merely associating an organization with controversial figures—even those despised by the organization’s core constituency—does not constitute actionable defamation under Virginia law.

The plaintiffs, the American Conservative Union (ACU) and the American Conservative Union Foundation (ACUF), host the annual Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) and publish ratings of state and federal lawmakers based on voting records. In February 2024, the defendant Institute for Legislative Analysis published a series of articles titled the “Soros Files,” authored by a former ACU employee. The articles included statements such as:

“Soros, Zuckerberg and Arnold have so heavily invested in CPAC to control its scorecard”
“Meet CPAC Billionaire Funder George Soros”
“CPAC has at least two Soros-funded prosecutors on its staff”

January 20, 2026

Accusations of Sexual Abuse Held Protected by Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine

by Lee E. Berlik

The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine traces its roots to Supreme Court precedent holding that the First Amendment secures a sphere of institutional autonomy for religious organizations. Under this jurisprudence, churches enjoy freedom from secular intrusion in matters central to their identity, including questions of faith, doctrine, and internal governance. Historically, courts applied the doctrine primarily in disputes involving church property and the appointment or removal of clergy. More recently, however, the Supreme Court has clarified that the doctrine extends equally to disagreements concerning internal church administration. (See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976)). In essence, when resolving a dispute would require a civil court to engage in substantial interpretation of religious law or ecclesiastical structure, the court must defer to the determinations of the church’s highest adjudicatory body and treat those decisions as binding with respect to issues of doctrine and governance.

The doctrine does not shield churches from judicial review of matters that are wholly secular in nature. The central concern is whether adjudication would require courts to interpret religious doctrine or to second-guess ecclesiastical judgments; the doctrine does not require courts to abstain simply because a dispute involves religious actors or has some incidental connection to religious principles. For example, a false accusation that a church member punched another church member in the face would not be protected because such a statement can be evaluated under neutral principles of law, without reference to issues of faith or religious doctrine. One might assume a false accusation of sexual abuse would also fall into this category, but as with any defamation claim, it depends on the context in which the statement was made. If it’s clear that the term “sexual abuse” was being used according to a church’s definition of sexual abuse, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine will indeed apply and protect the speaker from defamation liability. So held the Virginia Court of Appeals in the case of Catholic Diocese of Richmond v. Oliver Smalls, decided November 5, 2025.

December 20, 2025

Truth, as Defense, Must Match Defamatory Sting

by Lee E. Berlik

Truthful statements are generally not actionable as defamation. A substantially true statement that is factually accurate in all material respects and that does not imply any undisclosed defamatory message is not something upon which a defamation lawsuit may be brought. Still, a defendant who asserts a truth defense needs to establish not simply that some technical aspect of the statement is true but that its defamatory sting is true. When a published statement accuses the plaintiff of intentional criminal conduct, for example, the defendant cannot defeat a defamation per se claim by pointing to a technical or arguable inaccuracy in the statement as a whole that does not establish intentional criminal conduct.

Let’s look at last week’s decision in Patricia Thurston v. BankUnited, N.A., from the Western District of Virginia. Patricia Thurston owned residential real property in Roanoke County, which she sold in January 2024. Pike Title and Escrow, LLC, handled the closing and prepared a settlement statement showing that Thurston was to receive $66,484.74 in sale proceeds. Thurston provided wiring instructions for her Truist Bank account, and Pike Title transmitted those instructions to BankUnited, N.A., the bank that held Pike Title’s escrow account. On January 12, 2024, BankUnited wired the funds to Thurston’s account without incident, and the transaction initially appeared complete and proper. At the time of closing, a prior deed of trust on the property had been paid in full; Pike Title prepared a Certificate of Satisfaction reflecting that payoff and recorded it shortly thereafter, having charged Thurston a recording fee for that purpose.

November 11, 2025

Misleading Press Release Results in Defamation Claim

by Lee E. Berlik

Few workplace experiences are more demoralizing than being unfairly blamed by a superior for a mistake that was not one’s own, particularly when the error in fact originated with the supervisor. The injustice becomes especially acute when the supervisor or the employer has ready access to the media and the capacity to shape public perception through official press releases. When that power is misused to shift blame and to publicly impugn the competence or character of a subordinate, the reputational damage can be severe. If a press release contains a false statement that tends to lower an employee in the estimation of the community or deter others from associating with him, defamation liability may arise.

The Western District of Virginia recently faced such a situation and decided the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts on his defamation claim to survive a motion to dismiss. The facts of Jacob T. Unger v. Timothy C. Carter are essentially as follows, as laid out in the opinion (and derived from the allegations in the complaint).

October 16, 2025

Legislative Immunity Only Protects Legislative Acts

by Lee E. Berlik

Among the types of statements protected from defamation claims by an absolute privilege are statements made in connection with the proceedings of bodies creating legislation. Earlier today, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued an opinion in Brooks-Buck v. Wahlstrom in which it offered some clarification regarding the scope of this legislative immunity. At issue was whether a school board member’s written statement was protected by common-law legislative immunity when made during internal disciplinary proceedings targeting another board member. The statement claimed that the plaintiff, Deborah Wahlstrom, had committed perjury in an earlier FOIA action.

The Court held that while initiating disciplinary proceedings against fellow board members is a protected legislative function, legislative immunity does not extend to statements about third parties when those statements are not integral to the legislative act itself. In affirming the lower court’s denial of immunity at the demurrer stage, the Court emphasized that the shield of legislative immunity does not protect defamatory statements that stray from the core purposes of legislative activity. (The Court did note, by the way, that the immunity argument should have been raised by a plea in bar, not a demurrer, since legislative immunity is an affirmative defense.)

September 10, 2025

Reporting on Allegations Doesn’t Necessarily Imply They’re True

by Lee E. Berlik

When an individual is publicly accused of misconduct, reporting on the existence of such allegations—without more—does not necessarily give rise to a claim for defamation. This principle is not just a matter of common sense; it is a well-established rule in Virginia defamation law, where courts require that allegedly defamatory implications be tied to the actual words used by the speaker or writer and reasonably drawn from those words. The Court of Appeals of Virginia reaffirmed this principle in Alexander v. The Martin Agency, decided September 9, 2025. In a decision affirming the dismissal of a defamation claim, the court made clear that merely referring to the fact that allegations were made—without asserting or implying their truth—is not actionable as defamation.

The opinion describes the facts of the case as follows. Joe Alexander is the former Chief Creative Officer at The Martin Agency. He resigned in late 2017 after the company received multiple sexual harassment complaints against him. These events were widely covered in the media, with various reports describing the nature of the allegations and linking his departure to the resulting scandal. In the wake of Alexander’s resignation, The Martin Agency hired Kristen Cavallo as CEO, a move broadly celebrated as a turning point for the company’s culture and public image. In 2019, the agency reposted on its website three articles that praised Cavallo’s leadership and discussed the broader cultural shift following Alexander’s departure. The articles referenced the prior sexual harassment allegations and described them as part of the backdrop to Cavallo’s hiring and leadership. One article referred to Alexander as having “behaved badly,” and another quoted Cavallo as saying, “Don’t waste a good crisis,” in reference to the company’s transformation.

July 24, 2025

Privileged Statements to the Police

by Lee E. Berlik

In Virginia, citizens enjoy a qualified privilege to report suspected crimes to law enforcement. But what happens when such a report turns out to be wrong—or even wildly untrue? Can the accused sue for defamation? The answer, as highlighted by two recent decisions from the Virginia Court of Appeals, depends not on whether the statement was ultimately false, but on whether it was made in good faith. Two opinions issued just months apart reached starkly different conclusions on the viability of defamation claims stemming from reports to police. In Massie v. Ulta Beauty, Inc. (decided July 1, 2025), the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to throw the case out on demurrer. By contrast, in Kidd v. Bazazan (decided May 13, 2025), the court affirmed a jury verdict awarding $150,000 in damages. Both cases involved statements made to the police. The distinguishing factor was the existence or absence of malice.

As discussed earlier on this blog, Virginia law recognizes a qualified privilege for statements made to law enforcement about suspected crimes. That means a speaker is generally shielded from defamation liability for such statements unless the plaintiff can show by “clear and convincing” evidence that the privilege has been lost or abused. This could happen if, for example, (1) the statements were made with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard for their truth; (2) the statements were communicated to third parties who have no duty or interest in the subject matter; (3) the statements were motivated by personal spite or ill will; (4) the statements included strong or violent language disproportionate to the occasion; or (5) the statements were not made in good faith.

June 20, 2025

Virginia’s “Exact Words” Requirement: Don’t Sue If You Don’t Know What Was Said

by Lee E. Berlik

Virginia state courts have made it abundantly clear: if you’re going to sue someone for defamation, you’d better know exactly what they said—and be able to plead those words with precision at the outset of the case, without the benefit of the discovery process. In Bennett v. Lundh, a June 2025 opinion from the Court of Appeals of Virginia, the court reinforced this long-standing doctrine in emphatic terms. The opinion doesn’t just affirm the dismissal of a defamation claim with prejudice—it offers a primer on why the “in haec verba” (i.e., verbatim) pleading standard exists, how it works, and what happens when a plaintiff ignores it.

The basic facts of the case go like this: Ian Wesley Bennett and Katerina Lundh were coworkers working under a federal government contract. In August 2022, the two attended a business trip to San Francisco. According to the complaint, an incident occurred after dinner one evening in which Lundh—allegedly intoxicated—bumped into Bennett. He claims to have playfully nudged her, after which she slapped him across the face. Later, he made a comment about her personal history, prompting a second slap. Hours later, at a bar with colleagues, a coworker confronted Bennett, accusing him of grabbing Lundh and threatening to report him. That same accusation was apparently referenced in subsequent disciplinary action and ultimately contributed to Bennett’s removal from the government contract.