Malice Category Archives — Page 2 of 3 — The Virginia Defamation Law Blog Published by Reston Defamation Attorney — Virginia Slander & Libel Lawyer

September 9, 2013

“Actual Malice” Is Not Actually Malice

Where an otherwise defamatory statement is subject to a qualified privilege, a plaintiff can overcome that privilege by showing that the defendant acted with actual malice. However, “actual malice” in the context of a defamation action–also known as “New York Times malice,” is a different concept than the common-law malice ordinarily required to support an award of punitive damages. Actual malice does not require evil intent, spite, or ill will. A speaker acts with actual malice when he knows that his statement is false or acts with reckless disregard as to its truth. Mere dislike of the plaintiff is not sufficient to indicate a speaker acted with actual malice.

The standard for whether a defendant has uttered a defamatory statement with actual malice is a subjective one. In a lawsuit against a newspaper, for example, the plaintiff would not necessarily prevail merely by showing that the publisher failed to conduct a sufficient factual investigation or that a “reasonably prudent” publisher would not have published the story. Reckless disregard for the truth requires more than just a departure from professional journalistic standards. (See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989)). Rather, the court must get into the mind of the publisher and determine its state of mind at the time of publication. Reckless disregard for truth requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, such as when a publisher entertains “serious doubts as to the truth of his publication” but publishes the story anyway. (See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).

The distinction between actual malice and common-law malice was explained last month in the Texas case of Tyson v. Austin Eating Disorders Partners, LLC. Edward Tyson worked for Austin Eating Disorders Partners (AED) as medical director of AED’s Austin eating disorder treatment center. After Tyson was removed from his position, he asked his accountant to inquire about AED’s improved financials. Mark McCallum, CFO of AED, responded to the inquiry with an email to Tyson, AED’s Board of Directors, AED’s attorney, and AED’s accountant stating that AED’s financials had improved because Tyson had been a bad medical director who had no idea how to run the treatment center and took kickbacks for referring patients to other facilities. In a Second Amended Complaint asserting various defamation theories, Tyson conceded that McCallum’s email was subject to a qualified privilege, but argued that he overcame the privilege by alleging that McCallum acted with actual malice. AED and McCallum moved to dismiss the claim.

August 26, 2013

Reliance on Responsible Source Negates Actual Malice

by Lee E. Berlik

When a defamatory statement is made about a public figure, a plaintiff must prove that the statement was published with actual malice, i.e. with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Mere proof that a defendant failed to investigate the truth of a statement is not enough to show actual malice, and where a defendant relies on a responsible source in making a statement, he has not been grossly negligent, much less malicious. However, evidence of intent to avoid the truth can be sufficient to satisfy the actual malice standard. The Second Circuit recently addressed these issues in Dongguk University v. Yale University.

When Shin Jeong-ah applied for a position as an art history professor at the prestigious Dongguk University in South Korea, she stated that she held a Ph.D. from Yale University in Art History, and she submitted a document on Yale University letterhead that purported to be a certification of her degree. The certification contained an exact reproduction of Yale Associate Dean Pamela Schirmeister’s signature but misspelled the name and also misspelled the word “century” in Shin’s listed concentration – Twentieth Century Art. Nevertheless, Dongguk hired Shin and sent Yale an Inquiry Letter with the certification attached seeking to verify its authenticity. Dean Schirmeister received the letter and responded via fax “confirming that the attached letter [the certification] was issued by the Yale Graduate School and signed by me.”

Two years later, Dongguk became suspicious that Shin may have plagiarized her dissertation. An investigation revealed that Yale had no record of the dissertation and that in fact Shin had not received a Ph.D. from Yale. The Korean press latched on to the story, and Yale’s Deputy Counsel Susan Carney and Dean Edward Barnaby began referring all Shin-related media inquiries to its Office of Public Affairs.

July 29, 2013

Mann’s Defamation Suit Survives Anti-SLAPP Motion

by Lee E. Berlik

Well-known climate scientist Michael Mann made good on his threat to sue the National Review and columnist Mark Steyn for defamation based on statements made online questioning Mann’s global warming research. In response, the defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under D.C.’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the online statements were made in furtherance of the right of advocacy on an issue of public interest. The court found that the anti-SLAPP statute did apply but nevertheless denied the motion.

Mann is a professor of meteorology and the Director of the Early System Science Center at Penn State. He is well known for his research on global warming and has published papers and books on the subject. The University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit (CRU) exchanged emails with Mann which were later misappropriated. In one email, a CRU scientist referred to Mann’s “nature trick” of adding in real temperatures for the last twenty years and from 1961 to “hide the decline.” Upon discovery of the emails, the University of East Anglia investigated the matter and concluded that the honesty and rigor of the CRU scientists was not in doubt but that the email referencing Mann’s “nature trick” was misleading.

In 2010, Penn State initiated an investigation of Mann and the CRU emails. The investigatory committee was comprised entirely of Penn State faculty members. Based on an interview with Mann, the committee cleared Mann of three of four charges against him. The last charge involved an allegation that Mann’s research might deviate from accepted norms. The committee interviewed an MIT professor who was critical of Mann’s work and later expressed dismay with the scope of the investigation and the committee’s analysis of the CRU emails.

April 2, 2013

Proving Malice in Defamation-By-Implication Cases

by Lee E. Berlik

In ordinary defamation cases, proving malice is a straightforward affair because the statement at issue is only capable of being understood in a defamatory sense and the only question is whether the speaker knew the statement was false (or acted with reckless disregard to its falsity). Conversely, in defamation-by-implication cases, the allegedly defamatory statement has two possible meanings: one that is defamatory and one that is not. This complicates the malice inquiry because the speaker may or may not have intended to imply the defamatory meaning.

Recently, the Third Circuit had the opportunity to consider (1) whether the actual malice standard applies differently in defamation-by-implication cases such that more than knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth is required and (2) if the standard is different, can a plaintiff can satisfy the actual malice standard by showing defendant’s mere awareness of a defamatory implication and reckless disregard of that implication or whether plaintiff must show actual intent to convey a defamatory meaning.

The Third Circuit agreed with several other circuits that plaintiffs in defamation-by-implication cases must show something beyond knowledge of, or recklessness in regard to, the FALSITY of the statement’s defamatory

February 22, 2013

False Accusation of Sexual Aggressiveness Per Se Defamatory, Claims FBI Agent

by Lee E. Berlik

Workplace defamation suits will usually raise privilege issues. When one employee complains to a manager or supervisor about another employee and falsely maligns the other employee’s reputation in the process, the court will need to sort out whether the complaint is protected by qualified privilege. If it is, the statement can’t form the basis for a claim unless it was made with common-law malice or made to persons having no business hearing it. Common-law malice is different than the constitutional “New York Times” malice so often discussed in analyzing defamation liability. Common-law malice generally refers to some form of ill will on behalf of the speaker, motivated by things like hatred or a desire for revenge. In Virginia, there is a presumption that the speaker acted without malice.

When a slanderous statement occurs at work, it often involves an accusation that a co-worker is unfit to perform the duties of his or her job, due to a lack of competence or lack of integrity. Statements such as these which prejudice a person is his or her profession fall into the defamation per se category, which means that a jury can presume the statement was harmful to the plaintiff, even if special damages are not proven.

Earlier this month, a case from Stafford County was removed to federal court in Alexandria. Suzanne Brown, the plaintiff, was an FBI agent assigned to the Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) within the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG). The BAU handles cases involving threatened violence against public officials, and as a program manager, Brown was responsible for assessing such threats. Katherine Schoeneman, the defendant, is a psychologist who had formerly worked with Brown on some threat assessment cases under a contract with CIRG. Schoeneman offered her psychological observations while Brown provided investigative and law enforcement expertise.

January 9, 2013

Absence of Malice Presumed in Employment Context

by Lee E. Berlik

Emmett Jafari sued the Greater Richmond Transit Company for defamation and retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Jafari was a Specialized Transportation Field Supervisor for a Virginia company that transported clients enrolled in a state economic program. John Rush, a GRTC driver, told Jafari’s Chief Operating Officer, Eldridge Coles, that (1) he had seen Jafari in a heated discussion with a client in front of her home and (2) when the client boarded the van, she said Jafari had told her, “If you have something to say, say it to my face.” Coles allegedly told Jafari’s supervisor, Von Tisdale, “a customer had complained that Mr. Jafari told her ‘if you have something to say, say it to my face.'” When Jafari was later fired, he sued, alleging Coles’ statement to Von Tisdale was defamatory.

In Virginia, defamation requires (1) a publication, (2) an actionable false statement, and (3) negligence or malicious intent (depending on the circumstances). Statements made between co-employees and employers in matters pertaining to employee discipline and termination enjoy a qualified privilege, which insulates those statements from liability unless they are made with malice or shared with people (including fellow employees) who have no duty or interest in the subject matter. If a defendant makes a statement within the scope of a qualified privilege, then the statement is not actionable, even if false or based on erroneous information. The law presumes absence of malice.

To defeat this privilege, Jafari had to show, with “clear and convincing” evidence, the statements met the common law malice requirement, i.e., that they were said with “some sinister or corrupt motive such as hatred, revenge, personal spite, ill will, or desire to injure the plaintiff; or … made with such gross indifference and recklessness as to amount to a wanton or willful disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.” This he could not do, so the court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer.

November 29, 2012

Statements Based on Undisputed Facts Cannot Be Made With Actual Malice

by Lee E. Berlik

Attorney Ephraim Ugwuonye filed a defamation action against Omoyele Sowore, founder of Saharareporters.com, based on articles appearing on that website. Having previously been found in another case to be a public figure, Ugwuonye was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the statements at issue were (1) defamatory; (2) false; and (3) made with actual malice. Public figures are required to prove that the defendant published a false statement with actual knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth. In this particular case, Mr. Ugwuonye was unable to meet that burden and the court entered summary judgment in favor of Mr. Sowore.

The statements at issue concerned real estate transactions in which Ugwuonye represented the Nigerian Embassy. The article claimed that Ugwuonye withheld the Embassy’s $1.5 million IRS tax refund due from the sales because the Nigerian government owed him legal fees for representation in other litigation. The article also commented on past professional misconduct proceedings against Ugwuonye and referred to Ugwuonye’s “professional shadiness.”

The court found that prior to writing the article, Sowore investigated public records, researched cases involving Ugwuonye and also spoke to Ugwuonye by phone. Ugwuonye admitted that he withheld the tax refund as a fee to compensate him for legal work. The court found that statements that were not disputed could not have been Generic gavel.jpg made with actual malice. Additionally, Ugwuonye did not submit any evidence that the statement regarding Ugwuonye’s past professional misconduct proceeding was made with actual malice, and because the statement was substantially accurate, he could not overcome the qualified privilege for fair and substantially accurate reports on legal proceedings. Finally, Ugwuonye did not offer evidence that the reference to “professional shadiness” was done with actual malice, and it also amounted to non-actionable opinion and privileged reporting.

May 2, 2012

Public Figure Fails to Present Plausible Defamation Case

by Lee E. Berlik

When a public figure alleges defamation, he must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the speaker made the defamatory statement with actual malice. Judge Henry E. Hudson of the Eastern District of Virginia confirmed this heightened standard when he dismissed the complaint brought by Wayne Besen, the Executive Director of Truth Wins Out (“TWO”), a non-profit organization that addresses anti-gay behavior.

Besen filed a claim for defamation per se against the non-profit organization Parents and Friends of Ex-Gays, Inc. (“PFOX”) and Gregory Quinlan, the President and CEO of the organization, after Quinlan made comments about Besen on local television and the organization’s blog. Specifically, Quinlan asserted that Besen once stated that someone should run Quinlan over with a bus or inject him with AIDS. On the PFOX blog, Quinlan also suggested that Besen had been fired from the Human Rights Campaign. Quinlan refused to retract either statement, even after Besen approached him about the comments.

Under Virginia law, defamation per se can be found where there are “words that impute to a person the commission of a crime of moral turpitude or which prejudice a person in his profession or trade.” If the plaintiff is a public figure, he must prove that the defendant published a false and defamatory statement with actual malice, meaning that it was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Plaintiffs can be public figures for all purposes and in all contexts, or may be “limited public figures” with respect only to a limited range of issues.

April 14, 2012

Slander of Pilot by Airline Results in $1.4 Million in Damages

by Lee E. Berlik

Workplace defamation suits can result in high damages awards. A former pilot and federal flight deck officer (FFDO), William Hoeper, successfully sued his former employer, Air Wisconsin, for defamation after one of its managers, Patrick Doyle, reported Hoeper to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as a potential threat to airline security. Last month, the Supreme Court of Colorado, applying Virginia law, upheld a $1.4 million jury verdict against Air Wisconsin.

Hoeper had been taking a test to fly a new plane. According to test administrators, Hoeper ended the test abruptly, raised his voice at the administrator, and used profanity. Afterwards, while Hoeper was waiting for his flight home, Doyle called TSA to report that Hoeper may be carrying his government-issued FFDO firearm and that he was concerned about Hoeper’s mental stability because Hoeper had been terminated that day.

When a plaintiff alleges defamation involving a “matter of public concern,” the defendant is entitled to First Amendment free speech protection unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the statement was false and made with actual malice. Actual malice is present if the statement was made by the defendant with (1) knowledge of the statement’s falsity or (2) reckless disregard as to the statement’s falsity. However, even before the plaintiff presents his case, an airline defendant may be able to avoid liability altogether under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which provides immunity from civil suits to “an air carrier who voluntarily discloses any suspicious transaction relevant to certain aircraft security statutes.” If the disclosures are made with actual knowledge or reckless disregard as to the statement’s falsity, however, ATSA immunity is lost and the plaintiff can proceed to demonstrating that a statement was defamatory.

February 6, 2012

Jeremy Mayfield’s Defamation Claims Against NASCAR Heard on Appeal

by Lee E. Berlik

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is poised to rule on the appeal of NASCAR driver Jeremy Allen Mayfield, who is appealing the dismissal of his case involving claims of defamation, breach of contract, and deceptive trade practices. The trial court had dismissed the case based in large part on contractual release and indemnification provisions, including a release of liability arising from the publication of the results of any substance-abuse test.

Mayfield entered into a written contract with NASCAR in which he agreed to submit to random drug testing. On May 1, 2009, NASCAR asked Mayfield to submit to such a test. He complied and informed David Black, the president of Aegis, the chemical company performing the test, that he had taken Claritin and Adderall just prior to submitting a sample for testing. On May 7, 2009, Mayfield was informed that his test came back positive for amphetamines. After some confusion about the number of samples and whether Aegis tested the correct sample, NASCAR informed Mayfield that he was suspended as a driver and as the owner of a team. The president of NASCAR, Brian France, then held a press conference announcing to the world that Mayfield had been suspended for taking either performance-enhancing or recreational drugs.

After the press conference, Black informed reporters that the positive test result had nothing to do with any over-the-counter medication. As a result of these public statements, Mayfield and his corporate NASCAR team filed suit against NASCAR, France, Aegis, and Black, claiming that they were responsible for publicly defaming him. Mayfield argued in the suit that the statements were “intentional, malicious, reckless and false.”