The Virginia Defamation Law Blog

May 14, 2015

Can Government Employees Be Sued for Defamation?

As a general rule, both the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia enjoy sovereign immunity, which shields the government entities and their agencies from defamation lawsuits as well as most other types of litigation. The law becomes trickier when applied to the employees of those governments. Federal employees are immune from defamation claims based on things they said while acting within the scope of their employment. Those who work for the Commonwealth of Virginia, on the other hand, or one of its counties, cities, or towns, don’t have it so easy. Virginia employees do enjoy some degree of sovereign immunity for their actions, but–with limited exceptions–the protection they are afforded is less than the absolute protection federal employees receive. Like federal employees, state and local employees must be acting within the scope of their employment to be potentially entitled to claim immunity, but state employees need to meet additional criteria before they will be granted immunity.

The Virginia Supreme Court has described sovereign immunity as “a rule of social policy, which protects the state from burdensome interference with the performance of its governmental functions and preserves its control over state funds, property, and instrumentalities.” This rule of social policy is essentially based on the following goals: (1) to protect the “public purse” (i.e., to preserve tax dollars), (2) to address the concern that officials might be unwilling to carry out their public duties if they lived in constant fear of being sued, (3) to encourage citizens to take public jobs, and (4) to permit the orderly administration of government by discouraging improper influence through vexatious litigation. (See Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 308 (1984)). Consideration of these policies is what guided the Virginia courts to develop a rule affording immunity to some state and local employees but not others.
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April 27, 2015

D.C. Anti-SLAPP Statute Does Not Apply in Federal Court

by Lee E. Berlik

On September 27, 2013, the District of Columbia District Court applied D.C.’s anti-SLAPP act, D.C. Code § 16-5501 et seq., to a defamation lawsuit brought by wealthy businessman Yasser Abbas against the Foreign Policy Group and journalist Jonathan Schanzer. For those interested in the facts of the case, my earlier coverage of the case is here. On April 24, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that pretrial dismissal of claims brought in federal diversity cases is governed by Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that because the anti-SLAPP act purports to address the same question, it does not apply in federal court. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case because the allegations were insufficient to state a claim for defamation under D.C. law.

The court summarized the workings of the anti-SLAPP statute as follows:

Under the Act as relevant here, a defendant may file a special motion to dismiss “any claim arising from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest.” D.C. Code § 16-5502(a). To obtain dismissal, the defendant first must make a “prima facie showing that the claim at issue arises from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest.” Id. § 16-5502(b). If the defendant makes that prima facie showing, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that “the claim is likely to succeed on the merits.” Id. If the plaintiff makes that showing, the defendant’s special motion to dismiss must be denied. Otherwise, the special motion to dismiss must be granted. See id. (As we will see, that likelihood of success requirement is important to this case.) While a special motion to dismiss is pending, discovery is stayed except for limited purposes. Id. § 16-5502(c). A defendant who prevails on a special motion to dismiss may recover the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney’s fees. Id. § 16-5504(a).

April 13, 2015

A Brief History of Virginia’s Anti-SLAPP Statute

by Lee E. Berlik

The First Amendment guarantees, among other freedoms, “the right of the people…to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” This right to petition is part of the First Amendment‘s free-speech protection, as it pertains to a particular form of freedom of expression. A lawsuit aimed at deterring or punishing citizens from exercising this First Amendment right, or from otherwise exercising their right to freely express their political views or engage in discourse on a matter of public concern, is known as a “SLAPP” suit. (SLAPP stands for “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation”). SLAPP suits usually don’t advertise the fact that they seek to chill the expression of ideas; they are often disguised as legitimate lawsuits for defamation or some other tort.

A majority of states have passed anti-SLAPP laws designed to facilitate the identification and early dismissal of frivolous SLAPP suits. Virginia is not one of those states. Until recently, Virginia had no anti-SLAPP law to speak of and gained a reputation among plaintiff’s lawyers as a welcoming jurisdiction friendly to questionable defamation suits. A movement is underway to fix that. A flurry of defamation lawsuits filed in Virginia by California congressman Devin Nunes inspired the introduction of House Bill 759, designed to bring Virginia’s anti-SLAPP law more in line with California’s more robust First Amendment protection. California’s anti-SLAPP law allows a defendant to make a “special” motion to dismiss if he or she can show the plaintiff’s claim arises from a statement made in connection with a public issue in furtherance of the right to free speech. If the court grants one of these special motions to strike, the anti-SLAPP statute requires the unsuccessful plaintiff to pay the defendant’s attorneys’ fees. (Attorneys’ fees are normally not recoverable in defamation actions, so this can be a powerful deterrent against meritless lawsuits.)

As of this writing, Virginia still has not enacted a traditional anti-SLAPP statute. But the law has evolved over the past 10-15 years and the trend is towards increased protection for free-speech rights. Here’s how Virginia’s anti-SLAPP protection has evolved over the years:
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March 16, 2015

Make the Online Harassment Stop

by Lee E. Berlik

Libel and slander are considered “torts.” The law of torts is designed to provide a remedy that will “make the plaintiff whole” to the fullest extent possible. Usually, we’re talking about money: how much money would it take to fully compensate the plaintiff for the harm caused caused to the person’s reputation by the defamation? What is the value of the reputation and what amount would fairly compensate the plaintiff for his or her emotional anguish? Often, however, plaintiffs are less interested in money than in halting or removing the damaging statements (especially if they were published online and continue to reach readers), or forcing the defendant to make a public retraction. This latter form of relief–asking the court to order someone to refrain from making certain statements or to perform an affirmative act–is considered “equitable” in nature, basically meaning that it will be guided by vague principles of fairness. A court order granting this relief is called an injunction. It’s almost impossible to get.

One might think that if the purpose of tort law is to provide plaintiffs with a complete remedy for the harm, an injunction would be a logical choice because it has the capacity to prevent harm from happening in the first place. Moreover, many affected by online defamation take the position that no amount of money can truly restore a damaged reputation or bring an end to the emotional distress caused thereby. But that’s not how the legal system works. Virginia law (like the law in most states) has a strong preference for money damages over injunctive relief. If the court finds that an award of money will fully compensate the plaintiff, it will not issue an injunction as a general rule. This means that unfortunately, there is often a huge disconnect between what victims of online defamation want and what the court is willing to give them.
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February 2, 2015

Statements Truthful When Made Won’t Become Defamatory Later

by Lee E. Berlik

The Internet is full of factual assertions that were true at the time they were first published, but no longer are. Can future events modify the factual and legal landscape in such a way as to create defamation liability where there initially was none?

Earlier I wrote about the case of Lorraine Martin v. Hearst Corporation. Lorraine Martin brought a defamation action against several news outlets which had published accounts of her arrest for drug-related charges. It’s not that she wasn’t arrested; her complaint was that the charges were dropped in 2012 and that the publications refused to remove the original articles, which were still available online and causing harm to her reputation. The statements had become false over time, she argued, because Connecticut has an “erasure statute” which provides that after a certain amount of time after the dismissal of a criminal charge, the charge is deemed “erased” and the person’s arrest record is wiped clean. The District of Connecticut rejected this argument, finding nothing in the statute to suggest that the legislature had intended to impose any requirements on anyone outside of courts or law enforcement. On January 28, 2015, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her claims.

On August 26, 2010, the Connecticut Post, Stamford Advocate, and Greenwich Time, all published articles online stating that Martin had been arrested and charged with numerous drug violations after police received information that a pair of brothers was selling marijuana in town. News 12 Interactive, LLC, published an Internet article reporting that Martin was arrested “after police say they confiscated 12 grams of marijuana, scales and traces of cocaine from [her] house.” Martin conceded that these statements were all true at the time they were originally published. (Note: even before reading the court’s analysis, it should be apparent to most of you that when a plaintiff admits her defamation action is based on a true statement, there are going to be problems.)

January 19, 2015

The Statute of Limitations for Defamation Actions

by Lee E. Berlik

Under the current statute, suits in Virginia for libel, slander, or “insulting words” can only be brought within one year from the time of publication. Earlier this month, delegate Dave Albo filed House Bill No. 1635, proposing that the Commonwealth increase the limitations period to two years, and providing further that in cases involving Internet defamation by anonymous tortfeasors, the statute of limitations be suspended (or “tolled”) upon a motion and showing of good cause. If the bill passes, it will make it a lot easier to identify and bring to justice those persons who use the Internet to conceal their identities while unleashing a barrage of false and harmful statements about another individual or business.

Statutes of limitation have been debated for hundreds of years. In a law review article written over 100 years ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. asked, “what is the justification for depriving a man of his rights, a pure evil as far as it goes, in consequence of the lapse of time?” In other words, why have statutes of limitation at all? Shouldn’t every wrong have a remedy? There are some who feel that claims should be resolved on their merits regardless of when they are brought, whereas others argue that untimely claims should be forever extinguished. Most states have reached a consensus that defamation claims should be limited to one or two years, primarily due to concerns about First Amendment principles and a desire to avoid the chilling of free speech.
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December 13, 2014

Is it Slander to Call Someone a Liar?

by Lee E. Berlik

California lawyer Tamara Green has accused Bill Cosby of sexual assault. Bill Cosby, speaking through his publicist, characterized the accusation as “discredited” and as amounting to “nothing.” First question: is Cosby calling Green a liar? Second question: is it defamatory to call someone a liar if they’re actually telling the truth? Third question: is a celebrity personally liable for defamatory statements made by that person’s attorney or publicist? Ms. Green believes the answers to all three questions are YES, judging by the fact that she sued Mr. Cosby for defamation a few days ago in Massachusetts federal court. Personally, I’m not so sure.

Let’s begin at the beginning: what did Cosby actually say? In defamation actions, it is important to know the exact words used, lest liability be based on embellishments or mischaracterizations of those words by the plaintiff’s attorney. First of all, it wasn’t Cosby himself who responded to Ms. Green’s allegations. Her lawsuit is based on statements made by his attorney and publicist. Back in 2005, when Ms. Green first went public with her accusations in an appearance on the Today Show (video below), Mr. Cosby’s lawyer at the time, Walter M. Phillips, Jr., allegedly issued a statement calling the accusations “absolutely false” and saying that the alleged assault “did not happen in any way, shape, or form.”

Years later, in a Newsweek interview published in February 2014, Cosby’s publicist (claimed to be David Brokaw) gave Newsweek this statement: “This is a 10-year-old, discredited accusation that proved to be nothing at the time, and is still nothing.” As if to demonstrate the reason we have a requirement here in Virginia to plead the actual words used, Ms. Green does not include this quotation in her complaint. Instead, she characterizes the statement as follows: “in an effort to continue the public branding of Plaintiff as a liar, Defendant Cosby through Brokaw stated explicitly, stated in effect, stated by innuendo, implied, and/or insinuated, that Defendant Cosby’s drugging and sexual assault against Plaintiff Green never occurred, and therefore that Plaintiff Green lied and was a liar.”
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November 24, 2014

Paul Brodeur’s Lawsuit Against Columbia Pictures

by Lee E. Berlik

So you may have heard that environmental scientist Paul Brodeur is seeking $1 million in damages for libel, defamation, slander and false light against the movie studios behind 2013’s highly acclaimed film American Hustle. Why? Because according to him, the movie damaged his reputation by “attributing…a scientifically unsupportable statement” to him. Had this action been filed in Virginia rather than California, it would not likely go very far.

Here’s the scene: it’s the late 1970s or early 1980s, and the two characters played by Christian Bale and Jennifer Lawrence are arguing about the new microwave oven that just exploded in their kitchen:

Irving Rosenfeld: I told you not to put metal in the science oven! What did you do that for?

November 7, 2014

No Intra-Corporate Immunity Against Defamation Claims

by Lee E. Berlik

Workplace defamation actions face a number of obstacles. The one that probably comes up the most is the issue of qualified privilege. Employees often claim that a manager or supervisor defamed them in the course of a termination or negative performance evaluation. These statements are usually protected from defamation claims, as a limited privilege applies to communications made on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest, or with reference to which he has a duty, if made to another person having a corresponding interest or duty. In other words, in situations where it is necessary or expected that one employee will make statements concerning the performance of another (such as a performance evaluation), a qualified privilege will apply.

Another defense that is sometimes raised in the employment context is that of “intra-corporate immunity.” This is a defense borrowed from the law of conspiracy. Because a conspiracy, by definition, requires at least two legally distinct persons, and because two employees acting within the scope of their employment duties are both acting as agents of their employer, a conspiracy cannot be formed between those two employees due to the unity of interest and absence of a second entity. “A corporation cannot conspire with itself,” is the oft-used way of describing the reasoning behind the doctrine.
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October 22, 2014

The Benefits of Apologizing for Libel or Slander

by Lee E. Berlik

Suppose you’ve spoken your mind about someone you don’t like and have been accused of defamation. Should you apologize? If you intentionally defamed the character of another person out of ill will or spite, you’re probably not going to want to apologize. But if you’ve either had a change of heart or a sudden realization that you’re about to get sued, there are some good reasons to say you’re sorry.

For one thing, apologizing–if done right–can mitigate the plaintiff’s damages. Plaintiffs who sue for libel or slander in Virginia aren’t just limited to recovery of out-of-pocket pecuniary losses; they can also recover damages for pure emotional distress. Even without proof of actual reputational harm, Virginia courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover compensation for mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation. In essence, the worse the plaintiff feels, the higher the potential for a large damages award. In the business world, studies of disgruntled customers have shown that they are more than twice as likely to forgive a company that performs poorly but then apologizes than one that offers payment in lieu of an apology. It stands to reason, then, that a plaintiff’s emotional distress will likely be diminished if you make a sincere, timely apology, and publish that apology to the same group to whom you made the defamatory remarks.
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