The Virginia Defamation Law Blog

January 9, 2013

Absence of Malice Presumed in Employment Context

Emmett Jafari sued the Greater Richmond Transit Company for defamation and retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Jafari was a Specialized Transportation Field Supervisor for a Virginia company that transported clients enrolled in a state economic program. John Rush, a GRTC driver, told Jafari’s Chief Operating Officer, Eldridge Coles, that (1) he had seen Jafari in a heated discussion with a client in front of her home and (2) when the client boarded the van, she said Jafari had told her, “If you have something to say, say it to my face.” Coles allegedly told Jafari’s supervisor, Von Tisdale, “a customer had complained that Mr. Jafari told her ‘if you have something to say, say it to my face.'” When Jafari was later fired, he sued, alleging Coles’ statement to Von Tisdale was defamatory.

In Virginia, defamation requires (1) a publication, (2) an actionable false statement, and (3) negligence or malicious intent (depending on the circumstances). Statements made between co-employees and employers in matters pertaining to employee discipline and termination enjoy a qualified privilege, which insulates those statements from liability unless they are made with malice or shared with people (including fellow employees) who have no duty or interest in the subject matter. If a defendant makes a statement within the scope of a qualified privilege, then the statement is not actionable, even if false or based on erroneous information. The law presumes absence of malice.

To defeat this privilege, Jafari had to show, with “clear and convincing” evidence, the statements met the common law malice requirement, i.e., that they were said with “some sinister or corrupt motive such as hatred, revenge, personal spite, ill will, or desire to injure the plaintiff; or … made with such gross indifference and recklessness as to amount to a wanton or willful disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.” This he could not do, so the court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer.

January 7, 2013

Defamatory Yelp Review Damaging Your Business? Don’t Expect it to Come Down Any Time Soon.

by Lee E. Berlik

Jane Perez hired Dietz Development to repair her townhome. When Perez became dissatisfied with Dietz’s performance, she fired Dietz and posted negative online reviews on both Yelp and Angie’s List. Her comments not only expressed her dissatisfaction with Dietz’s work but also implied that Dietz was responsible for some jewelry missing from Perez’s home. Dietz sued Perez for defamation in Fairfax County Circuit Court and requested a preliminary injunction ordering her to remove the statements.

Perez opposed the injunction but apparently did not argue that an injunction would be an impermissible “prior restraint” under the First Amendment. The trial judge gave Dietz a partial victory, enjoining any discussion of the missing jewelry and ordering Perez to delete certain misleading statements she had made about a related lawsuit. Perez filed a motion for reconsideration in which she raised the prior-restraint issue, and appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia shortly thereafter. Remarkably, the Supreme Court vacated the injunction just two days after the petition for appeal was filed and without even giving Dietz an opportunity to respond.

The First Amendment prohibits prior restraints on speech unless publication would threaten an interest more fundamental than the First Amendment itself. Perez argued that Dietz’s reputation as a businessman in the community does not rise to that level of importance. She also argued that although some jurisdictions allow an injunction against comments that have been found false and defamatory after a full trial, injunctions against speech that has not been found to be false and defamatory are never appropriate.

December 21, 2012

Lawyer Claims Huffington Post Defamed Him By Attributing Controversial Article to Him

by Lee E. Berlik

Panamanian lawyer Juan Carlos Noriega has brought a defamation suit in the District of Columbia against the Huffington Post for falsely attributing to him an “offensive” article he claims he had nothing to do with. The article, entitled “The Primacy of the Rule of Law,” (which has since been removed from the site) concerned a “fake vaccination program” that the Central Intelligence Agency ran in order to gather information on Osama Bin Laden. The CIA relied on Dr. Shakeel Afridi to run the vaccination program, and when he was arrested, the United States government called for his release.

The article claimed that the United States’ outrage over Dr. Afridi’s arrest was inconsistent with every nation’s basic commitment to the rule of law, and that the United States’ demand that Afridi be released showed a disregard for Pakistan’s democracy and jurisprudence. The article suggested that Afridi had violated the Hippocratic Oath and that, because of the fake campaign, Pakistani parents had become skeptical of vaccinations and were refusing to immunize their children. The article asserted that thousands of innocent Pakistani children may be crippled for life with polio or die from hepatitis because of the vaccination scheme. A link to the article revealed a short biography and picture of Noriega and listed him as one of “HuffPost’s signature line up of contributors.”

Noriega claims he has never written anything for the Huffington Post. He says he’s never even submitted a comment on the site or created an account. According to the complaint, The Huffington Post did not contact Noriega before publishing the article, and when Noriega’s counsel informed the Huffington Post that he had been a victim of identity theft and asked it to remove the article, the Huffington Post did not respond. Noriega asserts that the Huffington Post maliciously and negligently published the article and attributed to him “highly offensive and defamatory beliefs” concerning terrorism, Pakistan, bin Laden, the U.S. government and the CIA that he does not hold.

December 17, 2012

Internet Defamation Insufficient Basis for Personal Jurisdiction Against Colombia Company

by Lee E. Berlik

Carlos Henriquez and his wife traveled from their home in Georgia to Colombia to seek infertility treatments. They eventually contracted with a surrogate mother who gave birth to twins. A custody dispute arose between the Henriquezes and the surrogate, and a Colombian court awarded custody to the Henriquezes. A Colombian newspaper, El Pais, published articles about the case and placed the articles online where Georgia residents could access them. Henriquez brought a defamation claim against El Pais arguing that the articles were defamatory. El Pais moved to dismiss the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Henriquez contended that El Pais targeted his family and purposefully directed the defamatory statements at Georgia. He argued that the court had personal jurisdiction over El Pais because it published defamatory statements in print and on its web page that were seen in Georgia. Henriquez submitted evidence that the El Pais web page contained advertisements for U.S. companies that transacted business in Georgia, from which El Pais derived revenue.

El Pais argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because the advertisements were placed on its site by an ad server owned and operated by Pautefacil.com, a Colombian company. El Pais did not market its own goods but merely disseminated news stories. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and Henriquez appealed.

December 10, 2012

Defamatory Statements to Credit Reporting Agencies Held Not Preempted by FCRA

by Lee E. Berlik

Michelle Bourdelais brought a defamation claim in the Richmond Division of the Eastern District of Virginia against Chase Bank and Chase Home Finance, based on Chase’s alleged reporting of inaccurate information about the status of her mortgage payments to consumer reporting agencies. Chase moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that it was preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Judge Henry E. Hudson denied the motion, allowing the claim to proceed.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) contains two seemingly conflicting sections. Section 1681t(b)(1)(F) appears to preempt all state laws regarding the liability of credit reporting agencies, whereas § 1681h(e) preempts only certain types of common law actions and then only under certain circumstances. The court noted that although the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the issue, seven of nine district courts in the Fourth Circuit have reconciled this conflict by using the “statutory approach” and holding that §1681t(b)(1)(F) only applies to state statutory claims and § 1681h(e) only addresses state common law claims.

Bourdelais argued that the preemption provisions did not apply at all because Chase did not act as a furnisher of information to consumer reporting agencies and Kroll Factual Data, the party who provided Bourdelais’ credit report, was not a consumer reporting agency (“CRA”) within the meaning of the FCRA. The court rejected this argument and noted that the FCRA definitions of “furnisher” and “consumer reporting agency” clearly include Chase and Kroll.

December 5, 2012

How to Lose Your Defamation Case in Three Easy Steps

by Lee E. Berlik

First, don’t hire a lawyer. (What do lawyers know about defamation law, anyway?) Second, refuse to comply with the court’s orders and local rules. Finally, file a whole bunch of frivolous and nonsensical motions, such as a “Motion for Declaration All Rulings & Judgments Be Rendered Null & Void,” a motion against opposing counsel for engaging in “felonious conspirator tactics,” and a “Motion to Declare All Your Base Are Belong to Us.” With the exception of the “all your base” example, a defendant recently tried all of these tactics in North Carolina federal court and came away with a judgment against him that included punitive damages.

William Mann, a member of the Professional Golfers Association Hall of Fame, acquired a North Carolina country club but then declared bankruptcy and moved to South Carolina. M. Dale Swiggett sent a letter to hundreds of recipients accusing Mann of fraud and crimes and claiming Mann left North Carolina after declaring bankruptcy and paid cash for his South Carolina house. Swiggett then sent a letter to the judge who had presided over Mann’s bankruptcy, accusing Mann of covering up “sludge spreading and spills.”

Mann sued Swiggett in the Eastern District of North Carolina for libel, seeking $2 million in compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive damages for injury to his reputation and livelihood. Swiggett, acting pro se, responded by overloading the court’s docket with numerous groundless motions, inducing the court to strike his Answer as a sanction. After entering summary judgment in Mann’s favor, the only remaining issue was the amount of damages.

November 29, 2012

Statements Based on Undisputed Facts Cannot Be Made With Actual Malice

by Lee E. Berlik

Attorney Ephraim Ugwuonye filed a defamation action against Omoyele Sowore, founder of Saharareporters.com, based on articles appearing on that website. Having previously been found in another case to be a public figure, Ugwuonye was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the statements at issue were (1) defamatory; (2) false; and (3) made with actual malice. Public figures are required to prove that the defendant published a false statement with actual knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth. In this particular case, Mr. Ugwuonye was unable to meet that burden and the court entered summary judgment in favor of Mr. Sowore.

The statements at issue concerned real estate transactions in which Ugwuonye represented the Nigerian Embassy. The article claimed that Ugwuonye withheld the Embassy’s $1.5 million IRS tax refund due from the sales because the Nigerian government owed him legal fees for representation in other litigation. The article also commented on past professional misconduct proceedings against Ugwuonye and referred to Ugwuonye’s “professional shadiness.”

The court found that prior to writing the article, Sowore investigated public records, researched cases involving Ugwuonye and also spoke to Ugwuonye by phone. Ugwuonye admitted that he withheld the tax refund as a fee to compensate him for legal work. The court found that statements that were not disputed could not have been Generic gavel.jpg made with actual malice. Additionally, Ugwuonye did not submit any evidence that the statement regarding Ugwuonye’s past professional misconduct proceeding was made with actual malice, and because the statement was substantially accurate, he could not overcome the qualified privilege for fair and substantially accurate reports on legal proceedings. Finally, Ugwuonye did not offer evidence that the reference to “professional shadiness” was done with actual malice, and it also amounted to non-actionable opinion and privileged reporting.

November 5, 2012

Government Defamation May Violate Civil Rights

by Lee E. Berlik

In theory at least, when a government agency defames an individual, the defamation may be characterized as a violation of civil rights: a deprivation of “liberty” without due process of law. The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that an ordinary state-law defamation claim against the government will usually not be sufficient to state a civil rights claim. Under the “stigma plus” or “reputation-plus” test, a plaintiff must prove some loss beyond loss of reputation, such as the loss of a job. A recent New York case demonstrates how difficult it can be to maintain such an action.

Michael Jones, Jr., was Canandaigua, New York’s Planning Board Attorney in 2008. Per agreement, he billed at two rates, depending on the circumstances. The Town Board approved his billing statements until August when members of the Town Board challenged the billing. The Town Board investigated and published a report accusing Jones of ethical violations. It referred the matter to the District Attorney and took steps to get him fired, get him to resign, or prevent his contract from being renewed. He completed his contractual term but did not seek renewal, believing doing so would be futile.

Claiming the extensive press coverage hurt his legal practice, Jones sued the Town, the majority Town Board members, and the Town Board attorneys for several state law actions, including defamation. In his federal actions, he claimed the Town violated his right to substantive due process and his civil rights, denying him a property right of continued service as Planning Board Attorney and defaming him so badly that the stigma has substantially harmed his ability to practice law.

November 2, 2012

D.C. Defamation Cases Continue to Meet Anti-SLAPP Statute

by Lee E. Berlik

Statements made in the course of litigation by parties to the case are absolutely privileged and cannot form the basis of a defamation action. At the same time, reporters enjoy a “fair report” privilege that allows them to report and comment on judicial proceedings without fear of defamation liability, even if they repeat the allegedly defamatory statements in their coverage of the case, provided the report is a fair and accurate description of the case. Does it follow, then, that a litigant can make defamatory comments to a reporter during the course of a case? Most courts would answer that in the negative, since the reporter is not involved in the case. But if that litigant is speaking about an issue of public interest, such as the operation of the District’s financial office, his comments may be protected by D.C.’s anti-SLAPP act.

Eric Payne, former contracting director for the District of Columbia, sued D.C.’s Chief Financial Officer, Natwar Gandhi, for wrongful termination. In an interview with The Washington Post, Gandhi claimed that he fired Payne because he was “a very poor manager,” “nasty to people,” and “rude to outsiders.” Payne then sued Gandhi and the District of Columbia alleging that these remarks defamed him. The city has indicated that it plans to file a special motion to dismiss the case under the city’s anti-SLAPP statute.

A “SLAPP” (or Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) can exist in many forms but traditionally consists of a frivolous lawsuit filed by one side of a public debate against someone who has exercised the right of free speech to express an opposing viewpoint. The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted primarily to protect citizen activists from these lawsuits filed for intimidation purposes, but can be applied in any situation where the lawsuit threatens the right of advocacy on issues of public interest.

October 29, 2012

Summary Judgment Still Possible in Virginia State Court

by Lee E. Berlik

On October 4, 2012, the Virginia Supreme Court rejected the appeal of a personal trainer, represented by Virginia Beach lawyer Jeremiah A. Denton III, and allowed to stand the summary judgment order entered by the Norfolk Circuit Court against the trainer on her defamation claim. This shows just how serious the Virginia Supreme Court is about the absolute privilege that extends to defamatory statements made in demand letters preliminary to contemplated litigation and sent in good faith. Summary judgment is appropriate if a defamation claim is based on a privileged statement.

Darryl and Julie Cummings were members of the Norfolk Yacht and Country Club (“NYCC”). Deborah Allison, a personal trainer at NYCC and at Norfolk Academy, pursued and entered into a physical relationship with Julie. Darryl reported Addison’s actions to NYCC management. Though the NYCC warned her not to pursue Julie Cummings on NYCC property, Addison disobeyed and was fired. Cummings and his wife ultimately divorced.

Darryl sued Addison for intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference, and professional malpractice. Addison counterclaimed for intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with a contract expectancy, and defamation. Addison’s claims stemmed from Cummings’ email to the NYCC president, a draft complaint he sent to NYCC’s attorney, and emails he sent to Norfolk Academy’s headmaster.