The Virginia Defamation Law Blog

September 3, 2012

Fraud Accusations Prompt Michael Mann’s Lawyers to Threaten Litigation

Climate change scientist Dr. Michael Mann is threatening legal action against the National Review magazine for a blog post that appeared in “The Corner” section of its online publication. In the article, journalist Mark Steyn quoted writer Rand Simberg’s observation that Dr. Mann “could be said to be the Jerry Sandusky of climate science, except that instead of molesting children, he has molested and tortured data…” Mr. Steyn went on to call Mann “the man behind the fraudulent climate-change ‘hockey stick’ graph, the very ringmaster of the tree-ring circus.”

In a demand letter to the National Review, Dr. Mann’s attorney, John Williams, contends that Mr. Steyn’s statements amount to accusations of academic fraud and constitute defamation per se. He argues that the statements were false and were made with the knowledge that they were false. He cites several inquiries into his research which concluded that he has not engaged in academic fraud as proof that Mr. Steyn’s statements are false. Dr. Mann demands that the National Review retract the article and apologize or face legal action.

Dr. Mann may have a valid complaint, but he is going to have his work cut out for him. Dr. Mann is a well-known, much published and often quoted figure in the climate change debate. In fact, Dr. Mann has written a book on the climate change controversy. Courts have held that scientists who inject themselves into public controversies over scientific and political debates are public figures. As a public figure, Dr. Mann would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the National Review published a provably false statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

August 31, 2012

Virginia’s Insulting-Words Statute

by Lee E. Berlik

Freedom of speech is not without limitations. Under the “fighting words” exception, speech is unprotected if it tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace (i.e., it is inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction). Virginia is one of few states that has essentially codified the fighting words doctrine. Its “insulting words” statute is found at Section 8.01-45 of the Virginia Code.

The insulting words statute was first passed as part of the 1810 Anti-Dueling Act. The Anti-Dueling Act provided that “All words which, from their usual construction and common acceptation, are construed as insults, and tend to violence and breach of the peace, shall be actionable.” Today, over 200 years later, the language of the statute is virtually unchanged. Times have changed, but Virginia law still prohibits the utterance of words that are so insulting and offensive that the average person, upon hearing them, is likely to react with violence. Insulting-words jurisprudence has evolved over the years as a form of defamation law.

To recover in a private lawsuit brought under § 8.01-45, the words used must not only be insults, but they must be fighting words that “tend to violence and breach of the peace.” The United States Supreme Court has defined fighting words as “those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). The Supreme Court later expanded the definition by clarifying that provocation of “immediate” or “imminent” violence was required before mere insults could fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).

August 27, 2012

Section 230 Immunizes Users Who Link to Defamatory Statements of Others

by Lee E. Berlik

Under § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)), “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Federal courts in Virginia have held that § 230 creates federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers (as opposed to content providers) liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service. For example, Section 230 has been found to bar claims for defamation, tortious interference with business expectancy, and trademark infringement. In Directory Assistants, Inc. v. Supermedia, LLC, the court clarified that Section 230 immunity applies not only to providers but also to users.

Directory Assistants is an advertising consulting agency that helps businesses advertise in yellow page directories. SuperMedia also sells advertising solutions. Directory Assistants had been the subject of allegedly false and defamatory postings on consumer review websites such as RipOffReport.com, ScamInformer.com, and YellowPages.com. According to Directory Assistants, SuperMedia sent an email to a prospective customer that included links to the allegedly defamatory postings. Directory Assistants sued SuperMedia for defamation, and SuperMedia moved to dismiss, arguing protection under Section 230.

Reviewing relevant case law and the statutory language, the court found that Section 230 protects users equally as it does providers, and it held that although a person who creates unlawful content may be held liable, a user of an interactive computer service who finds and forwards via e-mail content that others have posted online in an interactive computer service is immune from liability.

August 23, 2012

Defamation By Implication Theory Prevents Dismissal of Art Analyst’s Case

by Lee E. Berlik

In Virginia, defamation liability can be based on a statement that is literally true, if the true meaning of the statement arises from reasonable inferences attributable to it rather than the actual words used. Some jurisdictions refuse to recognize this “defamation by implication” or “implied defamation” theory, but on August 9, 2012, the Southern District of New York issued an opinion demonstrating that New York is among the states that recognize the doctrine.

Peter Paul Biro is in the business of art restoration and authentication and is well known in the art world for having developed scientific approaches to art authentication through fingerprint analysis. In July 2011, The New Yorker published an article titled “The Mark of a Masterpiece: The man who keeps finding famous fingerprints on uncelebrated works of art.” (Note: a full copy of the article is attached to the opinion). Biro sued the magazine, investigative journalist David Grann, and others for defamation, claiming that various passages in the article damaged his reputation to the tune of two million dollars.

In Biro v. Condé Nast, the court adopted the Fourth Circuit‘s approach to defamatory implication claims, holding that a plaintiff must make an “especially rigorous showing” that (1) the language may be reasonably read to impart the false innuendo, and (2) the author intended or endorses the inference. Where an implication arises due to the omission rather than the expression of facts, the court will examine whether the omission would materially change the alleged implication.

August 13, 2012

Doctor’s Defamation Claim Reconsidered by Judge Roush

by Lee E. Berlik

Judge Jane Marum Roush of the Fairfax Circuit Court has allowed Dr. Adel Kebaish to amend his complaint against Inova Fairfax Hospital to include four additional statements claimed to be defamatory. Judge Roush had previously found the alleged statements non-actionable but was persuaded by the plaintiff’s attorneys to partially reconsider her earlier ruling.

Dr. Kebaish was an orthopedic and spine trauma surgeon at Inova Fairfax Hospital. Dr. Kebaish claims that Inova and several of its doctors and physician assistants defamed him and that Inova terminated him for objecting to substandard care and fraudulent billing practices. He filed a complaint against Inova, one of its administrators and ten of its doctors and physician assistants alleging causes of action for defamation per se as well as other business torts. The defendants demurred on various grounds.

The court reviewed each of the allegedly defamatory statements in the complaint and agreed with Inova that most of the statements were either statements of opinion, not actionable as defamation, or made by persons who were not named as defendants. To successfully state a claim for defamation in Virginia, a plaintiff must show that the defendant published a false factual statement that harms the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s reputation. Expressions of opinion are constitutionally protected and are not actionable as defamation.

August 6, 2012

Target of Online Griping Files Defamation Action

by Lee E. Berlik

Fairfax-based Direct Connect, LLC, a credit card processing company, has sued Inkthis, LLC, and its owner, Debra Sachs, for alleged defamation and tortious interference with contract. Direct Connect is upset about certain statements posted on Inkthis’ Facebook wall, including one that referred to Direct Connect as “a bunch of thieves.” The defendants recently removed the case from Fairfax Circuit Court to federal court in Alexandria.

The Facebook posts describe the author’s frustration with certain business practices of Direct Connect, including what the author believed to be excessive charges debited from Inkthis’ bank accounts. Direct Connect says the statements are false, that the defendants knew the statements were false when they made them and, by publishing descriptions of the company that included words like “inept,” “horrible,” and “thieves,” the statements harmed Direct Connect’s reputation.

Statements that are relative in nature and depend largely upon the speaker’s viewpoint are generally considered expressions of opinion. Opinions cannot form the basis of a defamation action as they are protected by the First Amendment and generally cannot be interpreted as stating a provably false fact, a prerequisite for any defamation claim. Thus, referring to Direct Connect as “inept” and “horrible” will likely be deemed non-actionable opinion. Referring to the company as “a bunch of thieves” presents a closer question.

July 30, 2012

Absolute Judicial Privilege Extends to Demand Letters Sent in Good Faith

by Lee E. Berlik

Earlier I wrote about the case of Mansfield v. Bernabei, in which Fairfax Circuit Court Judge R. Terrence Ney sustained demurrers to a defamation claim based on statements made in a draft complaint forwarded to a small group of prospective defendants for settlement purposes. Judge Ney ruled that the statements were privileged from defamation liability because they were preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding and sent in good faith. The Virginia Supreme Court has now affirmed that decision and set forth a new test for determining the applicability of the judicial privilege in Virginia.

Under the new test, communications made outside of court but preliminary to proposed judicial proceedings will be absolutely privileged from defamation liability where (1) the statement is made preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding; (2) the statement is “material, relevant or pertinent” to the proceeding; (3) the proceeding is contemplated in good faith and is under serious consideration; and (4) the communication is disclosed only to persons having an interest in the proposed proceeding.

(Note: The court enumerated only three elements, combining (2) and (3) above. Because the test contains four distinct concepts, I find it easier to think of this as a four-part test. But that’s just me.)

July 22, 2012

No Defamation Claim for Medical Resident’s Poor Performance Evaluation

by Lee E. Berlik

Employment reviews often lead to libel allegations due to the fact they often contain harmful statements perceived by the employee to be false and defamatory. In most cases, however, even if the performance review contains a false statement, no defamation claim will lie because (1) statements of opinion are not actionable under Virginia law (or the United States Constitution); and (2) communications between people on a subject in which they both have an “interest or duty” are deemed privileged.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered–and rejected–the defamation claims of Claudine Nigro, a former medical resident at the Shenandoah Valley Family Residency Program. After a semiannual performance review in 2009, Nigro was notified that she would not be renewed for another year of residency with the program. Nigro appealed this decision, but then resigned a few months later. She brought an action against the residency program’s director and the hospital itself, claiming that she was defamed during the appeals process by the director of the program, who discussed her perceived shortcomings with the faculty appeals committee, and by employees of the hospital, who reported Nigro for allegedly recording her conversations with physicians.

Nigro alleged the Program Director defamed her with statements he made in various meetings and notices, including “There has been no evidence of improvement or intention to improve in weak areas,” “There is no change in apathetic/disinterested approach or demonstrated interest in learning despite 3-4 months of discussion and coaching,” and “There is faculty consensus that [Nigro] may be suffering from depression or poor career choice.” The court found that all the alleged statements were either opinion, factually true, not defamatory, or were protected by the qualified privilege applicable to statements made to another with a corresponding interest or duty.

July 5, 2012

Court Excludes Unreliable Expert Testimony in Defamation Case

by Lee E. Berlik

A court’s role is to act as a “gatekeeper” where evidence is concerned, and under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a court should exclude expert testimony that is not reliable and helpful to the jury. Rule 702 provides that an expert’s opinion is reliable if (1) it is based upon sufficient facts; (2) it is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently applied this three prong test and granted a defendant’s motion to exclude expert testimony in a defamation case.

In Parsi v. Daioleslam, Dr. Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) and NIAC filed a defamation action against Seid Hassan Daioleslam alleging that Daioleslam published numerous false and defamatory statements on internet websites characterizing plaintiffs as members of a subversive and illegal Iranian lobby. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s statements injured their reputations, hampered NIAC’s effectiveness as an advocacy group, and damaged their fundraising efforts. In support of their claims, plaintiffs proffered two experts. Plaintiffs hoped that the testimony of Debashis Aikat, a journalism professor, would establish that defendant’s writings did not meet the standard of care for journalists. Plaintiffs submitted the testimony of Joel Morse, a financial economist, to establish plaintiff’s economic damages suffered as a result of the alleged defamation. Defendant moved to exclude both men’s testimony, arguing that neither expert’s testimony met the standards of admissibility.

The court found all three reliability prongs of Rule 702 lacking in Aikat’s testimony. First, the “sufficient facts” Aikat relied on were defendant’s articles and sources cited therein. Because Aikat read only a haphazard selection of defendant’s sources and no background material, the court found the “facts and data” Aikat relied on to be insufficient. Second, the court found Aikat’s testimony was not the product of reliable principles and methods. Aikat refused to give any description of his methodology beyond reading and viewing. The court noted that Aikat’s methodology could have been to compare defendant’s performance to applicable professional standards, which would have been an acceptable methodology.

June 29, 2012

Breach of Non-Disparagement Agreement Leads to Defamation Claim

by Lee E. Berlik

The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia has found that negative comments a customer service representative made to a customer may form the basis of a defamation action.

Charles and Donna Bates operate a school photography business. They entered a contract with Strawbridge Studios, Inc., also a school photography business, under which Strawbridge purchased the Bates’ accounts and employed them to handle certain accounts. The relationship deteriorated and ended in the Bates filing a breach of contract action again Strawbridge. The parties resolved their dispute and entered a settlement agreement which included a non-disparagement clause providing that neither party would “say, write, publish, broadcast, or in any other way participate in negative or disparaging comments about the other.”

Later, when a customer called Strawbridge looking for a photograph she believed the Bates had taken, Strawbridge’s customer service representative told the customer that the Bates were “not reputable” and “could not be trusted.” The representative also stated that “things got so bad” that Strawbridge “had to get involved in a lawsuit.” The Bates filed a second suit against Strawbridge and included a claim for defamation.