The Virginia Defamation Law Blog

September 17, 2012

Punitive Damages in Libel Case Reduced by 75%

A jury awarded Russell Ebersole $7,500 in compensatory damages and $60,000 in punitive damages on his libel claim against Bridget Kline-Perry in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Ms. Kline-Perry moved for a new trial or, alternatively, a reduction of the punitive damages award, which the court treated as a motion for remittitur. Finding $60,000 to be unconstitutionally excessive, the court remitted the punitive damages to $15,000 and gave Mr. Ebersole the option of accepting the reduced amount or requesting a new trial.

The court agreed with Ms. Kline-Perry that the $60,000 award of punitive damages violated her right to due process. When faced with an excessive verdict, courts will generally order a remittitur. Remittitur is a process by which the court reduces the damages award while giving the plaintiff the option of re-trying the case in lieu of accepting the reduction. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide specifically for remittitur, but precedent holds that a court should order remittitur when a jury award is so excessive as to result in a miscarriage of justice.

In determining whether a jury award of punitive damages violates due process, courts consider (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.

September 11, 2012

“Dirtiest Hotels” List is Rhetorical Hyperbole and Not Grounds for Defamation Action

by Lee E. Berlik

Kenneth M. Seaton, sole proprietor of the Grant Resort Hotel and Convention Center in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee, brought a defamation action against TripAdvisor after the hotel was identified by the travel site as the dirtiest hotel in America. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, however, found that TripAdvisor’s list of “2011 Dirtiest Hotels” could not support a defamation claim and dismissed the case on August 22, 2012.

TripAdvisor relies solely on customer reviews to compile its “Dirtiest Hotels” list – it does not conduct an independent investigation of each hotel. Seaton claimed that TripAdvisor attempted to assure the public that its list is factual, reliable and trustworthy by including the following statements along with its list: (1) “World’s Most Trusted Travel Advice”; (2) “TripAdvisor lifts the lid on America’s Dirtiest Hotels”; (3) “Top 10 U.S. Crime-Scenes Revealed, According to Traveler Cleanliness Ratings”; (4) “Now, in its sixth year, and true to its promise to share the whole truth about hotels to help travelers plan their trips, TripAdvisor names and shames the nation’s most hair-raising hotels”; (5) “This year, the tarnished title of America’s dirtiest hotel goes to Grand Resort Hotel and Convention Center, in Pigeon Forge, Tennessee.” The list quoted a TripAdvisor user: “There was dirt at least ½ inch thick in the bathtub which was filled with lots of dark hair.” The list also featured a photograph of a ripped bedspread.

Defamation claims require proof of false statements or false implications. Seaton contended that by publishing its “2011 Dirtiest Hotels” list, TripAdvisor was implying that the Grand Resort Hotel and Convention Center was, in fact, the dirtiest hotel in the United States and that a reasonable person reading the list would consider this supposed fact in making their travel plans. Seaton argued that the list was not mere hyperbole because it contained actual numerical rankings with comments suggesting that the rankings were based in actual fact.

September 7, 2012

Defamation in the Virginia Workplace

by Lee E. Berlik

Defamation claims arise frequently in the employment context. Your boss and your co-workers are subject to the same libel and slander laws that apply outside the workplace, and they need to be careful not to exceed the boundaries of fair criticism. The employment relationship, however, does present special challenges to a contemplated defamation lawsuit. As any good defamation lawyer will tell you, a primary obstacle in establishing defamation liability in the employment context is the existence of qualified privilege.

Workplace defamation suits often involve statements made during performance evaluations, tenure review, or employee terminations. These statements will often be deemed privileged, as a limited privilege applies to communications made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest, or with reference to which he has a duty if made to another person having a corresponding interest or duty. Performance evaluations, tenure reviews, and employee terminations all typically involve situations where it is necessary or expected to make statements about another individual that could potentially affect another’s professional standing or reputation.

The protection offered by qualified privilege can be lost, however, if it is abused. If statements are made to a third party having no business hearing the information, they lack the requisite “corresponding interest or duty” and the privilege may be lost. Similarly, the qualified “interest or duty” privilege can be defeated if the plaintiff shows the defamatory statements were made with malice.

September 3, 2012

Fraud Accusations Prompt Michael Mann’s Lawyers to Threaten Litigation

by Lee E. Berlik

Climate change scientist Dr. Michael Mann is threatening legal action against the National Review magazine for a blog post that appeared in “The Corner” section of its online publication. In the article, journalist Mark Steyn quoted writer Rand Simberg’s observation that Dr. Mann “could be said to be the Jerry Sandusky of climate science, except that instead of molesting children, he has molested and tortured data…” Mr. Steyn went on to call Mann “the man behind the fraudulent climate-change ‘hockey stick’ graph, the very ringmaster of the tree-ring circus.”

In a demand letter to the National Review, Dr. Mann’s attorney, John Williams, contends that Mr. Steyn’s statements amount to accusations of academic fraud and constitute defamation per se. He argues that the statements were false and were made with the knowledge that they were false. He cites several inquiries into his research which concluded that he has not engaged in academic fraud as proof that Mr. Steyn’s statements are false. Dr. Mann demands that the National Review retract the article and apologize or face legal action.

Dr. Mann may have a valid complaint, but he is going to have his work cut out for him. Dr. Mann is a well-known, much published and often quoted figure in the climate change debate. In fact, Dr. Mann has written a book on the climate change controversy. Courts have held that scientists who inject themselves into public controversies over scientific and political debates are public figures. As a public figure, Dr. Mann would have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the National Review published a provably false statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

August 31, 2012

Virginia’s Insulting-Words Statute

by Lee E. Berlik

Freedom of speech is not without limitations. Under the “fighting words” exception, speech is unprotected if it tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace (i.e., it is inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction). Virginia is one of few states that has essentially codified the fighting words doctrine. Its “insulting words” statute is found at Section 8.01-45 of the Virginia Code.

The insulting words statute was first passed as part of the 1810 Anti-Dueling Act. The Anti-Dueling Act provided that “All words which, from their usual construction and common acceptation, are construed as insults, and tend to violence and breach of the peace, shall be actionable.” Today, over 200 years later, the language of the statute is virtually unchanged. Times have changed, but Virginia law still prohibits the utterance of words that are so insulting and offensive that the average person, upon hearing them, is likely to react with violence. Insulting-words jurisprudence has evolved over the years as a form of defamation law.

To recover in a private lawsuit brought under § 8.01-45, the words used must not only be insults, but they must be fighting words that “tend to violence and breach of the peace.” The United States Supreme Court has defined fighting words as “those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). The Supreme Court later expanded the definition by clarifying that provocation of “immediate” or “imminent” violence was required before mere insults could fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982).

August 27, 2012

Section 230 Immunizes Users Who Link to Defamatory Statements of Others

by Lee E. Berlik

Under § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)), “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Federal courts in Virginia have held that § 230 creates federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers (as opposed to content providers) liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service. For example, Section 230 has been found to bar claims for defamation, tortious interference with business expectancy, and trademark infringement. In Directory Assistants, Inc. v. Supermedia, LLC, the court clarified that Section 230 immunity applies not only to providers but also to users.

Directory Assistants is an advertising consulting agency that helps businesses advertise in yellow page directories. SuperMedia also sells advertising solutions. Directory Assistants had been the subject of allegedly false and defamatory postings on consumer review websites such as RipOffReport.com, ScamInformer.com, and YellowPages.com. According to Directory Assistants, SuperMedia sent an email to a prospective customer that included links to the allegedly defamatory postings. Directory Assistants sued SuperMedia for defamation, and SuperMedia moved to dismiss, arguing protection under Section 230.

Reviewing relevant case law and the statutory language, the court found that Section 230 protects users equally as it does providers, and it held that although a person who creates unlawful content may be held liable, a user of an interactive computer service who finds and forwards via e-mail content that others have posted online in an interactive computer service is immune from liability.

August 23, 2012

Defamation By Implication Theory Prevents Dismissal of Art Analyst’s Case

by Lee E. Berlik

In Virginia, defamation liability can be based on a statement that is literally true, if the true meaning of the statement arises from reasonable inferences attributable to it rather than the actual words used. Some jurisdictions refuse to recognize this “defamation by implication” or “implied defamation” theory, but on August 9, 2012, the Southern District of New York issued an opinion demonstrating that New York is among the states that recognize the doctrine.

Peter Paul Biro is in the business of art restoration and authentication and is well known in the art world for having developed scientific approaches to art authentication through fingerprint analysis. In July 2011, The New Yorker published an article titled “The Mark of a Masterpiece: The man who keeps finding famous fingerprints on uncelebrated works of art.” (Note: a full copy of the article is attached to the opinion). Biro sued the magazine, investigative journalist David Grann, and others for defamation, claiming that various passages in the article damaged his reputation to the tune of two million dollars.

In Biro v. Condé Nast, the court adopted the Fourth Circuit‘s approach to defamatory implication claims, holding that a plaintiff must make an “especially rigorous showing” that (1) the language may be reasonably read to impart the false innuendo, and (2) the author intended or endorses the inference. Where an implication arises due to the omission rather than the expression of facts, the court will examine whether the omission would materially change the alleged implication.

August 13, 2012

Doctor’s Defamation Claim Reconsidered by Judge Roush

by Lee E. Berlik

Judge Jane Marum Roush of the Fairfax Circuit Court has allowed Dr. Adel Kebaish to amend his complaint against Inova Fairfax Hospital to include four additional statements claimed to be defamatory. Judge Roush had previously found the alleged statements non-actionable but was persuaded by the plaintiff’s attorneys to partially reconsider her earlier ruling.

Dr. Kebaish was an orthopedic and spine trauma surgeon at Inova Fairfax Hospital. Dr. Kebaish claims that Inova and several of its doctors and physician assistants defamed him and that Inova terminated him for objecting to substandard care and fraudulent billing practices. He filed a complaint against Inova, one of its administrators and ten of its doctors and physician assistants alleging causes of action for defamation per se as well as other business torts. The defendants demurred on various grounds.

The court reviewed each of the allegedly defamatory statements in the complaint and agreed with Inova that most of the statements were either statements of opinion, not actionable as defamation, or made by persons who were not named as defendants. To successfully state a claim for defamation in Virginia, a plaintiff must show that the defendant published a false factual statement that harms the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s reputation. Expressions of opinion are constitutionally protected and are not actionable as defamation.

August 6, 2012

Target of Online Griping Files Defamation Action

by Lee E. Berlik

Fairfax-based Direct Connect, LLC, a credit card processing company, has sued Inkthis, LLC, and its owner, Debra Sachs, for alleged defamation and tortious interference with contract. Direct Connect is upset about certain statements posted on Inkthis’ Facebook wall, including one that referred to Direct Connect as “a bunch of thieves.” The defendants recently removed the case from Fairfax Circuit Court to federal court in Alexandria.

The Facebook posts describe the author’s frustration with certain business practices of Direct Connect, including what the author believed to be excessive charges debited from Inkthis’ bank accounts. Direct Connect says the statements are false, that the defendants knew the statements were false when they made them and, by publishing descriptions of the company that included words like “inept,” “horrible,” and “thieves,” the statements harmed Direct Connect’s reputation.

Statements that are relative in nature and depend largely upon the speaker’s viewpoint are generally considered expressions of opinion. Opinions cannot form the basis of a defamation action as they are protected by the First Amendment and generally cannot be interpreted as stating a provably false fact, a prerequisite for any defamation claim. Thus, referring to Direct Connect as “inept” and “horrible” will likely be deemed non-actionable opinion. Referring to the company as “a bunch of thieves” presents a closer question.

July 30, 2012

Absolute Judicial Privilege Extends to Demand Letters Sent in Good Faith

by Lee E. Berlik

Earlier I wrote about the case of Mansfield v. Bernabei, in which Fairfax Circuit Court Judge R. Terrence Ney sustained demurrers to a defamation claim based on statements made in a draft complaint forwarded to a small group of prospective defendants for settlement purposes. Judge Ney ruled that the statements were privileged from defamation liability because they were preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding and sent in good faith. The Virginia Supreme Court has now affirmed that decision and set forth a new test for determining the applicability of the judicial privilege in Virginia.

Under the new test, communications made outside of court but preliminary to proposed judicial proceedings will be absolutely privileged from defamation liability where (1) the statement is made preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding; (2) the statement is “material, relevant or pertinent” to the proceeding; (3) the proceeding is contemplated in good faith and is under serious consideration; and (4) the communication is disclosed only to persons having an interest in the proposed proceeding.

(Note: The court enumerated only three elements, combining (2) and (3) above. Because the test contains four distinct concepts, I find it easier to think of this as a four-part test. But that’s just me.)