The Virginia Defamation Law Blog
In a decision that should give comfort to political commentators everywhere, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed a $1,000,000 defamation verdict against a citizen who called a local school board chairman a “SEXUAL PREDATOR/HARASSER” on Facebook. The case is Petrak v. Sawyers, Record No. 0110-24-4 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2025), and it offers a textbook illustration of the principle that even the most inflammatory language can be protected opinion when the speaker fully discloses the facts on which the opinion is based. The plaintiff, Ryan Sawyers, pointed out the lack of sexual harassment complaints against him or criminal convictions and argued that the “sexual predator” label was therefore false and defamatory. Although the trial court agreed with him, the Court of Appeals did not, and clarified that statements that fully disclose their factual predicate and do not imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts are not actionable if that factual predicate is true.
The basic facts of the case are these. Ryan Sawyers was the Chairman of the Prince William County School Board. While serving in that role, he commented on a local librarian’s Facebook photo, referring to her as a “LILF.” The defendant, Bill Petrak, interpreted the remark as vulgar sexual innuendo and was disgusted by it, particularly considering Sawyers was a married man, serving on the school board, and running for Congress. (Sawyers denied the comment was sexual, claiming with a straight face that the acronym stood for “Librarian I’d Like to Fund”). Petrak, who had been leading a recall effort against Sawyers, responded with his own Facebook post in a group called “PWC Education Reform.” In that post, Petrak shared screenshots of Sawyers’s LILF comment, a tweet in which Sawyers had thanked then-Senator Al Franken, and a photograph of Franken groping (or pretending to grope) a sleeping woman on a military plane. Petrak added the following commentary:
Look closely and see the comment by Ryan Sawyers. It says “such a LILF”. I am told this person is a librarian. So basically Ryan Sawyers, a married man, is publicly saying on social media that he would like to have sex with this woman. If that isn’t the behavior of a SEXUAL PREDATOR or HARASSER I don’t know what is.
Was the characterization over the top? Perhaps. Several readers of Petrak’s post said as much in the comments, calling the sexual-predator label a “stretch.” But the question before the court was not whether the label was fair or proportionate—it was whether the label was actionable as defamation. The Court of Appeals held it was not, reasoning that Petrak’s statements were non-actionable expressions of opinion protected by both the First Amendment and the Virginia Constitution. The court applied the framework established in Schaecher v. Bouffault, 290 Va. 83 (2015), which holds that an expression of opinion based on fully disclosed, non-defamatory facts is not actionable, no matter how harsh or unreasonable the opinion might be.
Three factors drove the court’s analysis. First, Petrak’s Facebook post fully disclosed the factual predicates underlying his opinion: the LILF comment, the Franken tweet, and the Franken photograph. He laid all his cards on the table. There was no suggestion that he was privy to some undisclosed set of facts that would give his “sexual predator” label additional defamatory sting. Second, Sawyers did not allege that the underlying disclosed facts were false. He admitted making the LILF comment. He admitted thanking Franken on Twitter. His dispute was only with Petrak’s interpretation and characterization of those facts. Third, reasonable readers of Petrak’s comment could only interpret it as an expression of Petrak’s personal views regarding Sawyers’ known conduct, not as an implication that Sawyers had committed sexual assault or some other sex crime. The court pointed to Petrak’s rhetorical phrasing: “If that isn’t the behavior of a SEXUAL PREDATOR or HARASSER, I don’t know what is.” The language signaled a personal viewpoint rather than a factual assertion. Even the more declarative statement that Sawyers “is an open serving SEXUAL PREDATOR/HARASSER” was 
introduced by the word “So,” tying it back to the disclosed facts as a conclusion drawn from them.
The court was careful to note that its holding should not be read to mean that calling someone a “sexual predator” can never be defamatory. In a different context (e.g., where the speaker implies knowledge of undisclosed criminal conduct, or where the speaker includes untrue factual details), such a label could absolutely constitute defamation per se. But where, as here, the speaker makes clear that the sole basis for the characterization is a publicly known, undisputed comment, the label amounts to nothing more than the speaker’s subjective (if extreme) interpretation of admitted facts.
The opinion also addresses Virginia’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code § 8.01-223.2, and its interaction with the opinion doctrine. The parties had stipulated that Petrak’s Facebook post addressed a matter of public concern, as it pertained to the fitness of a school board chairman for public office. The trial court had nonetheless denied anti-SLAPP immunity on the ground that the jury found Petrak acted with “actual malice.”
The Court of Appeals rejected that reasoning. Because Petrak’s statements were constitutionally protected opinion, the court held, they could not be “false” within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute’s exception for statements made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Actual malice requires a provably false factual statement; it simply cannot be established when the statements at issue convey no provably false meaning. With the exception inapplicable, the anti-SLAPP statute’s immunity applied, and the court remanded the case for the trial court to consider an award of attorney fees under Code § 8.01-223.2(C).
Practitioners should note the practical implications of the anti-SLAPP holding. We already know that statements of opinion are not actionable. But Petrak v. Sawyers establishes that when statements of opinion relate to a matter of public concern, any defamation claim based on those statements may result in an award of attorney fees. When a defendant’s speech qualifies as protected opinion on a matter of public concern, the anti-SLAPP statute provides absolute immunity. The actual malice exception has no work to do, because opinions are not capable of being proven false in the first place.